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This paper will attempt to introduce the reader to the federal
estate and gift taxes by analyzing briefly the principal provisions of
the taxes and the relation of those provisions to each other. Its
*James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University.
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purpose is twofold. It is designed to offer the student who is com-
mencing his study of the estate and gift taxes a chance to contem-
plate the forest before he plunges into the trees, in the hope of
making his trip among the trees less confusing. It is also intended
to serve as a survey of the estate and gift taxes for the student who
does not elect to study those taxes and the practitioner who is not
familiar with them, in an effort to supply the minimum knowledge
which a lawyer needs, not to solve, but to recognize, an estate or
gift tax problem when he encounters one.
Since the federal gift tax is simply a supplement to the federal
estate tax, the logical order in which to take up the two taxes is to
commence with the estate tax. Before turning to the estate tax,
however, it may be helpful to talk briefly about the nature of death
taxes in general.
A death tax is the price the sovereign exacts for the privilege of
transferring property at death. Although the tax is measured by
the property which is transferred, the subject of the tax is the
transfer of property. If an economist has difficulty discovering a
real distinction between a tax upon property and a tax upon the
transfer of property which is a prescribed percentage of the prop-
erty transferred, it is because he lacks the trained perception of a
lawyer. The distinction between the subject and measure of a death
tax is a real legal distinction because it is a distinction that results
in practical differences. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a federal inheritance tax' and of a
federal estate tax2 against the challenge that the taxes were direct
taxes upon property, which were invalid for lack of apportionment,
by pointing out that they were indirect taxes or excises on the
transfer of property, which did not require apportionment. The
doctrine of intergovernmental immunities does not apply to death
taxes because such taxes are imposed upon the transfer of property
rather than the property transferred.' It should be obvious to any-
one that the federal estate tax applies to the transmission of state
bonds because a tax upon the transfer of the bonds, unlike a direct
tax upon the bonds themselves, is not a burden upon state borrow-
ing power. The distinction between a tax upon the transfer of
property and a tax upon the property transferred also plays an
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
:New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
a Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384 (1922); Plummer v. Coler, 178
U.S. 115 (1900).
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important role in interpreting tax exemptions, which are construed
as limited to taxes upon the exempt property, as distinguished from
taxes upon the transfer of the property. Thus, for example, the
federal estate tax applied to government life insurance under a
statute exempting such insurance from all taxes because the statutory
exemption was limited to taxes upon the insurance itself and did
not extend to a tax upon the transfer of the insurance.
4
The federal estate tax is an estate tax. Death taxes are of two
types: estate or transfer taxes and inheritance or succession taxes.
The theoretical distinction between the two is that an estate or trans-
fer tax is imposed upon the privilege of passing on property at
death, while an inheritance or succession tax is imposed on the
privilege of acquiring property from a decedent. Upon a practical
plane, the distinction between an estate tax and an inheritance tax
is that the estate tax is measured by the taxable estate which passed
from a decedent at his death, and, except in the case of charitable
gifts5 and gifts to a surviving spouse,0 is not affected by the character
of the beneficiaries of the estate. An inheritance tax, on the other
hand, is graduated according to the size of the individual bene-
ficiary's share of the estate and the relation between the beneficiary
and the decedent.
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
I. T aE GRoss ESTATE
Probably the easiest way to grasp the basic pattern of the federal
estate tax is to consider the various steps in the computation of the
tax. The first step is to list all the property which the decedent
transferred by means of a transfer taxed under the tax. The sum
total of this property is called the gross estate and corresponds to
gross income under the income tax and gross gifts under the gift
tax.
The key to the gross estate lies in the fact that although the
primary purpose of the estate tax is to tax the transmission of
property at death, it is not limited to such transfers. It would be a
simple matter to avoid a death tax which was confined to transfers
by will and intestacy-strictly testamentary transfers. Consequently,
'United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 57 (1939).
'The federal estate tax allows a deduction for charitable transfers. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055.
' The federal estate tax allows a deduction for certain transfers to a
surviving spouse. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
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Congress has surrounded the primary tax upon the transfer of
property owned by a decedent at his death by a periphery of pro-
tective taxes upon other types of transfers that have some of the
aspects of a testamentary transfer and would otherwise be resorted
to in order to escape a tax limited to strictly testamentary transfers.
To be specific, the federal estate tax taxes:
(1) The transfer of property by will and intestacy;
7
(2) Dower and curtesy and their statutory substitutes; s
(3) Transfers in contemplation of death;9
(4) Transfers with retained life estates ;10
(5) Transfers taking effect at death;"1
(6) Revocable transfers ;12
(7) Certain survivor annuities -13
(8) Survivorship in connection with joint tenancies and tenancies
by the entirety ;14
(9) General powers of appointment ;15 and
(10) Life insurance.10
A careful examination of the transfers taxed under the federal
estate tax will reveal that they fall into two general categories.
First, the statute taxes the transfer of property at death. These
taxes include not only the tax upon transfers by will and intestacy
imposed by section 2033, but also various taxes imposed upon trans-
fers which are in substance transfers at death, although they may
not be classified as such under the technical rules of the property
law. Thus, section 2034 expressly taxes dower and curtesy and
their statutory substitutes to eliminate any question about whether
these interests arise due to the death of a spouse or originate during
his life in the marital relation. Section 2040 taxes survivorship in
joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety because the property
law denies that there is a transfer here. Since a power of appoint-
ment is not regarded as an estate in property, section 2041 expressly
taxes property subject to a general power of appointment to the
estate of the donee of the power by equating the power with owner-
ship of the property subject to the power. Finally, section 2042
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2034.
o INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
•" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
"' INT. Rmv. CODE OF 1954, § 2037.
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
"S INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039.
', INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.16 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
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treats life insurance as property passing from the insured at his
death.
In addition to taxing the transfer of property at death, the
statute taxes certain inter vivos transfers because they have some of
the substantial advantages of a will and might otherwise be resorted
to in order to avoid the estate tax. The taxes on inter vivos transfers
fall into two categories. Transfers in contemplation of death"7
are taxed, even though they take the form of absolute transfers
under which the transferor parts irrevocably with the transferred
property during his life, because the transferor intended the trans-
fer to serve as a substitute for a will or testamentary disposition.
The other inter vivos transfers that are taxed under the statute are
taxed, not because of the subjective state of mind of the transferor,
but because of the objective operation of the transfers, which are
not completed until the transferor's death. Thus, for example,
section 2036 taxes transfers under which the transferor retained
the possession or enjoyment of the transferred property until his
death; section 2037 taxes transfers taking effect at death; and
section 2038 taxes transfers where the transferor possessed power
to change the enjoyment of the transferred property at his death.
A. Transfers at Death
1. Transfers by Will and Intestacy.-Section 2033 provides:
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of
his death." Only interests of the decedent that survive his death
are taxable under this section. Thus, for example, a life estate which
the decedent owned at his death, unless it was an estate pur autre
vie that survived his death, is not taxable under section 2033.18
If the decedent originally owned the fee in the property and trans-
ferred it during his life retaining a life estate, the property will be
taxed to his estate. However, the tax will be imposed under section
2036 upon the original inter vivos transfer, rather than under section
2033 upon the interest the decedent owned in the transferred prop-
erty at his death.
There are several possible reasons why section 2033 is limited
to inheritable interests, or interests in property which survive the de-
7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
Helvering v. Rhodes, 117 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Gertrude L. Royce,
46 B.T.A. 1090 (1942).
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cedent's death. It would be possible to interpret section 2033 literally
to require inclusion of any property interests the decedent owned at
his death in his gross estate and then to value those interests which
ceased at his death at zero. It seems fairly clear, however, that what
Congress intended to tax under section 2033 was the transfer of
property by will or intestacy; it did not intend to impose any tax
under that section where the decedent lacked an inheritable interest
which he could transmit at his death.'9 As a practical matter, more-
over, in making out the estate tax return, interests which do not
survive the decedent's death are not listed as part of his gross estate
under section 2033.
Since section 2033 is limited to interests that the decedent owned
and transmitted at his death, property which someone acquires be-
cause of the decedent's death and in which the decedent owned no
interest will not be taxed to his estate under section 2033. Thus,
it has been ruled that rights of action for the wrongful death of a
decedent20 and death benefits paid under the social security laws,
where the decedent lacked power to designate the beneficiaries of
the payments,2 ' are not taxable to his estate under section 2033.
Various death benefits paid to dependents of a deceased employee
by his employer have also escaped a tax on this theory, although
some of these would be taxed today under section 2039.
It is not clear whether property might be taxed to a decedent's
estate under section 2033 upon the theory that in substance he owned
an inheritable interest in the property. In Helvering v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. the decedent was entitled to the income from several
trusts during his life and also possessed a general power to appoint
the remainders in the trusts after his death. Upon the assumption
that he had not exercised his powers of appointment, the government
Cf. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).,o Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 179. Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-581, 1955-2
Cum. BULL. 381 (death allowance of U.S. Armed Forces); Rev. Rul.
56-637, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 600 (death benefits under workmen's compen-
sation acts).
2 E.T. 18, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 285; Rev. Rul. 55-87, 1955-1 Cum. BULL.
112. Benefits payable to the estate of the decedent under Social Security
are included in his gross estate. E.T. 10, 1937-2 Cum. BULL. 469. Death
benefits payable under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 are also ex-
empt from the estate tax when the decedent cannot designate the recipients of
the payments. Rev. Rul. 60-70, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 372.
22 Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd on another
issue, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938); Estate of Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92
(1951); William L. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950).
22316 U.S. 56 (1942).
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contended that the trust properties were taxable to his estate under
section 2033, since in substance he owned the properties in fee. At
that time the statute taxed the exercise but not the nonexercise
of a general power of appointment. The Supreme Court held that
the property could not be taxed to the decedent's estate under sec-
tion 2033. It did not repudiate the possibility of a tax under that
section upon the basis of substantial ownership, but said that since
Congress had explicitly limited the tax on powers of appointment
to the exercise of the power, it did not intend to tax the nonexercise
under some other section of the statute. There are two difficulties
with invoking substantial ownership under section 2033. One is
that most of the situations in which a tax could be imposed on
this basis under section 2033 are already expressly covered by other
sections of the statute, and it is simpler to impose the tax under
those other sections. The other obstacle is the problem the gov-
ernment encountered in the Safe Deposit & Trust Co. case of
showing that by providing expressly for a tax in the situation in
question under some other section Congress did not intend to elim-
inate the possibility of a tax under section 2033. For example, in
one case the Tax Court held that jointly held property could not
be taxed to the estate of a deceased joint tenant under section 2033
because Congress intended to tax such property under the section
dealing specifically with jointly held property exclusively.2
All kinds of property are taxable under the estate tax. The
doctrine of intergovernmental immunities does not apply to death
taxes;2 moreover, statutory exemptions are generally construed
as limited to taxes upon the exempt property itself, as distinguished
from taxes upon the transfer of the property. 26 Consequently, the
fact that property is exempt from taxes under a statutory or im-
plied constitutional exemption will not prevent the property from
being taxed under the estate tax.2 7 Property exempt from creditors
is also subject to the estate tax.
The fact that property is located outside the United States is no
barrier to the estate tax as long as the property belongs to the
estate of a deceased citizen or resident of the United States. Juris-
diction to tax in the case of estates of citizens and residents is based
on the personal relation between the decedent and the United States
Nathalie Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945).
Cases cited note 3 supra.United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 57 (1939).
7Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b) (1958).
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and the fact that property is located outside the United States
does not preclude imposition of the tax. At one time foreign real
estate was not subject to the federal estate tax, but this rule was
changed in 1962. In the case of nonresident alien decedents where
there is no personal relation between the decedent and the United
States, the estate tax is limited to property situated in the United
States.28 United States citizens whose citizenship is derived from
birth or residence in a United States possession are treated as non-
resident aliens.29 For the most part, whether property is situated
in the United States is determined by the rules of common-law
situs. Thus, real estate located in the United States is situated in
the United States. So is tangible personal property, at least if it is
kept in the United States and is not just passing through this
country,30 unless the property is an art object being exhibited in the
United States or on its way to or from such an exhibition, for
which the statute makes a special exception.31 Intangible personal
property is property located in the United States if it is embodied
in a specialty which is kept in the United States3 2 or, in the case of a
nonspecialty chose in action, is enforceable against a person in the
United States.' The statute expressly provides, however, that
corporate stock is located where the corporation is incorporated.3,4
Moreover, life insurance on the life of a nonresident alien is not
property in the United States ;83 nor are deposits with a person in
the United States carrying on a banking business, as long as the
depositor was a nonresident alien who was not engaged in trade
or business in the United States at the time of his death.36 United
States Treasury bonds issued before March 1, 1941, are also ex-
cluded from the estate of a nonresident alien, if he was not engaged
in trade or business in the United States at the time of his death.,
For the purpose of the taxes upon inter vivos transfers, property
belonging to a nonresident alien is treated as situated in the United
States if it was located in the country either at the time of the
" INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2103.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2209.
'° Cf. Murchie v. Delaney, 177 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1949).
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 210 5(c).
3 Treas. Reg. § 20.2104-1 (a) (3) (1958).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2104-1(a) (4) (1958).
3 4
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2104(a).
3 3 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 210 5 (a).
3 6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2105(b).
3 7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2106(c).
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transfer or at the time of the transferor's death.3" This means that
if a man gave his wife a diamond necklace in contemplation of
death when both he and his wife were citizens and residents of a
foreign country, and his wife later left him and brought the neck-
lace to this country, where it was located at the time of his death,
the necklace would be subject to the federal estate tax, although the
United States apparently had nothing to do with the transfer of
the property.
Rights to income are taxable under the estate tax as well as the
ownership of principal. Thus, any income accrued at the date of the
decedent's death must be included in his gross estate.39 Income ac-
cruing after his death is not, however, included in his gross estate,
even though the income accrued during the year after his death and
the estate is valued according to the alternate valuation date.4" It
is not always easy to distinguish income accruing after the date of
a decedent's death from part of the property transferred at his
death. Thus, for example, there is considerable confusion whether
stock dividends distributed after a taxable transfer should be ex-
cluded from the transferor's estate as income accruing after the
transfer or should be included in his estate as part of the trans-
ferred stock. 4 There is also some confusion as to how the right
of a deceased partner's estate to participate in partnership profits
for a specified period after the partner's death should be treated.
Despite a Supreme Court decision which excluded the profits from
the deceased partner's taxable estate, apparently upon the theory
that they represented income accruing after his death,42 the pre-
vailing tendency is to require the right to profits to be included in
the decedent's estate as a valuable property right he owned at his
death.43
2. Dower or Curtesy Interests.-Dower and curtesy and their
statutory substitutes are explicitly taxed by section 2034 for fear
that they might escape a tax under the general language of section
8 NT. IEv. CODE OF 1954, § 2104(b).
"Merritt J. Corbett, 12 T.C. 163 (1949). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-
1(b. (1958).
0 Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443 (1941).
,x Tuck v. United States, 282 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1960); Estate of
Schlosser v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960); English v. United States, 270 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1959);
McGehee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958).
" Bull. v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
" Reigelman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1958) ; McClennan
v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
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2033 because of the argument that they originate in the marital re-
lation rather than in any testamentary transfer. Actually, the tax
on dower and curtesy operates in a negative fashion to require in-
clusion of the full value of the property owned by the deceased spouse
in his gross estate without any reduction for the interest of the
surviving spouse.
3. Joint Interests.-According to property law, when a joint
tenant or tenant by the entirety dies, his interest does not pass to the
surviving tenant or tenants, but continues in them since all of the
tenants possess a single undivided title that survives the death of any
tenant. Conceivably, this archaic feudal conception might prevent
a tax upon a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety under the
general language of section 2033. Therefore, section 2040 expressly
taxes joint estates by ignoring property conceptions and treating the
joint owners as owning the property according to their respective
contributions to the property. The same rule is applied to joint
bank deposits and purchases of United States savings bonds payable
to the purchaser or another. Thus, for example, if H bought
Blackacre and took title in his name and that of W as tenants by
the entirety, the full value of Blackacre would be taxed to H's
estate if he predeceased W, while nothing would be taxed to W's
estate if she predeceased H.
In determining the contributions of joint tenants to a joint
tenancy, anything originating with one joint owner is attributed to
him except to the extent that it was acquired from him for adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth. If, for example,
in the hypothetical situation in the preceding paragraph, W had paid
for Blackacre with 10,000 dollars H gave her as an anniversary
gift to use in any way she saw fit, the entire consideration for the
property would be attributed to H under section 2040.
Property acquired by joint tenants or tenants by the entirety by
gift or inheritance is treated as contributed by all of the tenants
equally. If, for example, H and W acquired Blackacre as tenants
by the entirety by virtue of a gift of the property by W's father,
half of the property would be attributed to H and taxed to his estate
if he predeceased W, while half of the property would be attributed
to W and taxed to her estate if she predeceased H.
Section 2040 is limited to joint tenancies and tenancies by the
entirety, that is, to tenancies where there is survivorship; it does
not apply to tenancies in common, which are taxed under section
[Vol. 44
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2033 according to the interest a deceased tenant in common owned
in the property at his death, irrespective of his contribution to the
property. Thus, if when H purchased Blackacre he had taken title
in his name and that of W as tenants in common, half of Blackacre
would have been taxed to his estate when he died and half of Black-
acre would have been taxed to W's estate when she died.
4. Powers of Appointment.-A power of appointment is not
an interest or estate in property but merely an authorization to
transfer title to property which the donee of the power does not own.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in United States v. Field4 4 held
that property subject to a power of appointment was not taxable
to the estate of the donee of the power under section 2033, even
though the power was a general power which the donee had exer-
cised by will, because the donee did not own the property. Section
2041 explicitly taxes powers of appointment to the estate of the
donee of the power.
Under section 2041, powers of appointment are divided into
powers created on or before October 21, 1942, which will be called
preexisting powers, and powers created after October 21, 1942,
which will be referred to as post-1942 powers. With one exception45
only general powers are taxed. Post-1942 general powers are
equated with the ownership of the property subject to the power,
and the property is taxed to the donee's estate if the power was in
existence at his death or if he exercised or released the power by
means of an inter vivos transfer taxed under the estate tax during
his life.46 The only way the donee of a post-1942 power can escape
either a gift tax or an estate tax upon the power is to disclaim or
renounce the power.4 7 The statute also provides, however, that
the inter vivos lapse of a post-1942 power will not be treated as a
taxable transfer to the extent that the property subject to the lapsed
power does not exceed the greater of 5,000 dollars or five per cent
of the fund from which the power could have been satisfied.4"
Only the exercise of a general preexisting power by will or an
"255 U.S. 257 (1921).
"A tax is imposed on the testamentary exercise of a post-1942 power
to create a second power "which under the applicable local law can be
validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any estate or interest in
such property, or suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of
such property, for a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the
creation of the first power." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(a) (3).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(a) (2).
1" Ibid.
"' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (2).
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inter vivos transfer taxable under the estate tax is taxed.4" The
release or the nonexercise of the power is not taxed. The reason
why a preexisting power is only equated with ownership of the
property subject to the power when the power is exercised is his-
torical. Under the 1918 act, prior to the 1942 act, only the exercise
of a power of appointment was taxed. With one exception 0 the
present statute perpetuates the pre-1942 treatment of powers of
appointment.
A general power of appointment is a power exercisable in favor
of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate.51 Ability to appoint to any one of these objects makes the
power general. The donee need not be empowered to appoint to all
of them. A power will not be treated as a general power, however,
if it is "a power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the
benefit of the decedent which is limited by an ascertainable standard
relating to the health, education, support or maintenance of the
decedent."52 Preexisting powers that can only be exercised by the
donee of the power with the consent of another person are not taxed
as general powers, even though the person whose consent is required
to exercise the power is a nonadverse person. 53 A joint post-1942
power is a taxable general power, however, unless the person whose
consent the donee must have to exercise the power is the donor of
the power or a person possessing a substantial adverse interest in
the property subject to the power.54 In the case of joint post-1942
powers which can be exercised by the donee without the consent of
the donor or an adverse party, only a fraction of the property sub-
ject to the power equal to the value of the property divided by the
donee and the persons who must join in the exercise of the power
and are possible appointees is taxed to the donee's estate.5
9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(a) (1)."0 Under the 1918 act no tax was imposed unless the property subject
to the power "passed" under the exercise of the power. Thus, there was no
tax when the donee of the power appointed to the taker in default of ap-
pointment provided the exercise of the power exactly "echoed" the default
clause. Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153 (1935). Under the current
law a tax is imposed when a preexisting power is exercised in a testamentary
fashion regardless of whether the property subject to the power passes
under the exercise of the power. Gartland v. Commissioner, 293 F.2d
575 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962).
5 IlNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1).
I
2 1NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041 (b) (1) (A).
5 3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1) (B).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1) (C) (i)-(ii).
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1) (C) (iii).
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5. Life Insurance.-Section 2042 taxes life insurance to the
estate of the insured where the insurance was payable to his estate,
or where the insurance was payable to other beneficiaries but the
insured possessed incidents of ownership in the insurance at his
death. The tax upon insurance payable to the insured's estate is
predicated upon his ownership of the insurance at his death and
resembles the tax imposed by section 2033 upon property owned by
a decedent at his death. The tax upon life insurance payable to
beneficiaries other than the insured's estate is analogous to the
taxes imposed by the estate tax on other incomplete inter vivos
transfers. By limiting the tax upon insurance payable to other bene-
ficiaries, however, to situations where the decedent possessed inci-
dents of ownership in the insurance, Congress made it possible for a
man to pass along unlimited amounts free of the estate tax by
investing in life insurance and giving up all rights to the insurance
before his death. The committee report accompanying this "loop-
hole" justified it on the ground that it simply treated life insurance
in the same way as other property, which, except in the case of
transfers in contemplation of death, is not attributed to the estate
of a decedent who divested himself of all interest in the property
during his life."' Actually, life insurance is taxed a little more
severely under section 2042 than incomplete transfers are taxed
under sections 2036, 2037, and 2038, since taxes are imposed under
those sections only where the decedent during his life transferred
the property in which he possessed an interest at his death, while
insurance may be taxed to the estate of the insured under section
2042 even though he did not transfer the insurance. In this respect
the tax on life insurance payable to other beneficiaries under section
2042 bears a closer resemblance to the taxation of powers of ap-
pointment under section 2041, since the donee of a power of appoint-
ment need not be, and indeed according to the Regulations cannot
be,5 7 the transferor of the property subject to the power of appoint-
ment that is taxed under section 2041. "Incidents of ownership"
which are the basis of the tax under section 2042 are much more
inclusive, however, than the general powers of appointment which
are taxed under section 2041; in this respect the tax under section
"H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A316, A317 (1954). A
minority of the Committee argued that life insurance is not like other
property, but is "inherently testamentary" and should be taxed differently
than other property. Id. at B14, B15."7Treas. Reg. § 20.2041(b)(2) (1958).
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2042 bears a closer resemblance to the taxes imposed on reserved
powers under sections 2036, 2037, and 2038.
Life insurance is taxable only to the estate of the insured under
section 2042. Section 2042 is not, however, exclusive. Life insur-
ance may be taxed to the estate of one other than the insured, and
even to the estate of the insured, under some other section of the
statute. Thus, for example, if a man assigned his life insurance
within three years of his death, irrevocably divesting himself of
all incidents of ownership in the insurance in order to get it out of
his taxable estate, the proceeds of the insurance would still be taxed
to his estate under section 2035 as a transfer in contemplation of
death.
B. Lifetime Transfers
1. Transfers in Contemplation of Death.-Various inter vivos
transfers are taxed under the estate tax because of some similarity to
a transfer by will. In most cases the similarity springs from the fact
that the transfer is not complete until the transferor's death. Trans-
fers in contemplation of death are taxed, however, not because the
transfer is incomplete during the transferor's life, but because they
proceed from a testamentary motive-the state of mind which a
man has when he makes a will.5"
It is obvious that the tax on transfers in contemplation of death
is necessary to prevent avoidance of the estate tax. If the tax
were confined to incomplete inter vivos transfers, it would be a
simple matter for one to escape the tax by waiting until he felt that
death was near and giving away property by an outright inter vivos
transfer. However, the government's inability to tax transfers even
by ancient transferors tottering on the brink of eternity is eloquent
testimony to the difficulty of administering a tax based on the sub-
jective state of mind of a dead man. Congress recognized this
difficulty as early as the first federal estate tax by providing a re-
buttable presumption that transfers within two years of the trans-
feror's death were in contemplation of death. Although the pre-
sumption proved constitutional,59 it also proved quite ineffective.
In 1926 Congress enacted a conclusive presumption that transfers
within two years of the transferor's death were in contemplation
" See United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931); Treas. Reg. § 20.
2035-1(c) (1958).
" Cf. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
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of death. The Supreme Court held that this presumption was un-
constitutional in Heiner v. Donnan ° Although it is unlikely that
Heiner v. Donnan would be followed today, Congress has not under-
taken to enact another conclusive presumption that transfers are in
contemplation of death. Instead, in 1950, it enacted the conclusive
presumption in the current Code61 that transfers more than three
years before the transferor's death are not in contemplation of death.
At the same time the two-year rebuttable presumption that transfers
are in contemplation of death was extended to three years.
6 2
Since the general purpose of taxing transfers in contemplation
of death is to prevent a man's escaping the estate tax by means of
such a transfer, it seems on principle that it should not be possible
to escape the tax by releasing a retained interest, which makes an
inter vivos transfer taxable under some other section of the statute,
in contemplation of death. For example, in United States v. Allen,"
a decedent during her life transferred property in trust retaining a
life estate in the trust property. Shortly before her death, she
released her life estate in exchange for the value of the life estate.
The Tenth Circuit held that the full value of the trust property less
the consideration received for the relinquishment of the life estate
was taxable to the decedent's estate. The court regarded the de-
cedent as having transferred in contemplation of death the interest
attributed to her for tax purposes before the transfer, rather than
merely her life estate. Although the Allen case is an admirable
decision as far as the underlying policy of the estate tax is concerned,
it conflicts with some decisions involving jointly held property that
have treated the transfer by a joint owner in contemplation of
death as limited to his interest in the jointly held property."4 More-
over, the fact that section 2038, taxing revocable trusts, expressly
provides that the release of a taxable power in contemplation of
death shall be ignored for tax purposes, raises some doubt whether
this provision can properly be implied in connection with the other
Go Ibid.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b).
02 Ibid.
02293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). Cf. Estate
of Vardell v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962).
0' Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949);
D. M. Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952), aff'd, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954).
Cf. Baltimore Natl Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955);
Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955); A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955).
Contra, Harris v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 736 (D. Neb. 1961).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sections taxing inter vivos transfers in the absence of express
language to that effect.
2. Transfers with Retained Life Estates.-An obvious way to
avoid a death tax limited to strictly testamentary transfers would be
to transfer property during one's life and retain the use of, or
income from, the property until death. Consequently, section 2036
(a) (1) taxes a transfer under which the transferor retained the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
transferred property "for his life or for any period not ascertain-
able without reference to his death or for any period which does not
in fact end before his death." Section 2036 (a) (2) imposes a tax
where the transferor instead of retaining the possession or enjoy-
ment of the transferred property directly kept "the right, either
alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom"
for the same periods. The 1916 act did not explicitly tax transfers
with a reservation of a life interest because of the belief that such
transfers were taxed under the general language taxing transfers
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
transferor's death. After the Supreme Court had held that a trans-
fer with a life interest was not taxed under this language,,5 Congress
amended the statute to tax expressly such transfers, and the Su-
preme Court held that this amendment was constitutional, 0 al-
though it was not retroactive and did not apply to transfers made
before the statute was amended."' Later the Supreme Court re-
pented its earlier decision and held that transfers with a reserva-
tion of a life interest were taxable after all as transfers intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death., To
overcome the retroactive effect of this decision section 2036(b)
of the 1954 Code provides that a transfer with a reservation of a
life interest shall not be taxed if the transfer was made before March
4, 1931 (since the joint resolution taxing such transfers expressly
was enacted on March 3, 1931), nor even if the transfer was made
after March 3, 1931, but before June 7, '1932, if it was not taxable
under the express language of the statute before it was amended
by the 1932 act.
" May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
" Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938).
Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
cs Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
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Although literally section 2036 taxes a transfer with a reserva-
tion of a life interest without providing expressly that the reserved
interest must continue until the transferor's death, it seems fairly
well settled that a tax will not be imposed under section 2036 unless
the transferor's interest in the transferred property persists until
his death, at least, if his interest was not released in contemplation
of death. 9
There is some uncertainty as to what kind of interest the trans-
feror must retain in order to incur a tax under section 2036. It is
enough if he retains either the income from, or the possession of,
the transferred property. He need not retain both. Moreover, a
transfer under which the transferee is obligated to use the income
from the transferred property to discharge the legal obligations
of the transferor is regarded as a transfer with a reservation of the
right to the income from the property.70 It seems to be settled
that the reservation of a contingent life estate to the transferor
will be taxable under section 2036,71 although there is a dispute as
to precisely what language imposes the tax. For example, suppose
that A on June 1, 1931, transferred property to T in trust to pay
the income from the property to B for life, then to A for life, and
then to distribute the trust property to C in fee, and A died yesterday
survived by B. Several cases have held that the trust property
could not be taxed to A's estate, since if the transfer were taxable
it would be taxable because A retained an interest in the property
for a period not ascertainable without reference to his death.72 This
was one of the additions of the 1932 act to section 2036, and
consequently, under section 2036(b), if the transfer can only be
taxed under this language, it is not taxable because it was made
before June 7, 1932. There is at least one case, however, that
o Rev. Rul. 56-324, 1952-2 Cum. BuLL. 999; Robert J. Cuddihy, 32 T.C.
1171 (1959). See In re Estate of Thurston, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P.2d 12
(1950). However, in United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961),
Judge Breitenstein, concurring, pointed out that the literal language of
section 2036 taxes a transfer with a reservation of a. life interest regardless
of what happens after the transfer: "As I read the statute, the tax liability
arises at the time of the intervivos transfer under which there was a reten-
tion of the right to income for life. The disposition thereafter of that re-
tained right does not eliminate the tax liability." Id. at 918.Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (2) (1958).
,1 Marks v. Higgins, 213 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v.
Nathan, 159 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
" Hubbard v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1957). See Treas.
Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (ii) (1958).
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holds that the transfer is taxable under the other language of the
statute and may be taxed since it occurred after March 3, 1931.3
There is also some uncertainty under section 2036 about the
meaning of a transfer under which the transferor retained the
possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the transferred
property for a period which did not in fact end before his death.
Although this would appear to cover any situation where the trans-
feror continued to possess or receive the income from the transferred
property until he died, there are several recent cases which limit the
tax to a transfer where the transferor made an agreement with the
transferee, albeit an unenforceable agreement, for retention of the
possession of, or income from, the property until his death.7
4
Although the cases have construed the language relating to the
periods for which a taxable interest must be retained under section
2036 somewhat strictly, they have gone to the opposite extreme in
defining the right to designate income or possession that is taxable.
Thus, a power to distribute or accumulate income has been held to be
a taxable power even where the income beneficiary and the re-
mainderman happened to be the same person. 75 The power which
will attract a tax under section 2036(a) (2) may be a fiduciary
power, as long as it is a discretionary power."0 It may also be a
power exercisable by the decedent alone or by the decedent in con-
junction with some other person, including apparently a person
possessing a substantial adverse interest in the transferred prop-
erty.77 Although it may not be a power vested in one other than
the transferor, the Regulations intimate that a contingent power will
be taxable under section 2036, even though the contingency upon
which the exercise of the power depends has not occurred at the
time of the decedent's death.78
3. Transfers Taking Effect at Death.-Section 2037 taxes a
transfer as a transfer taking effect at death where the transferee's
" Commissioner v. Estate of Arents, 297 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 848 (1962).
" Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965) ; Union
Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
Cf. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959).
"' Struthers v. Kelm, 218 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955). Cf. Industrial Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947).
"Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947).
" Treas..Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958)."8Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(b) (1958).
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possession or enjoyment was dependent upon surviving the trans-
feror, and, in addition, the transferor retained a reversionary in-
terest worth more than five per cent of the value of the transferred
property immediately before his death. It is immaterial whether the
transferror's reversionary interest arose by operation of law or by
the express terms of the instrument of transfer unless the transfer
occurred before October 8, 1949. A transfer before October 8,
1949, is taxable only if the reversionary interest arose by the express
terms of the instrument of transfer.
The statute defines a reversionary interest as a "possibility
that property transferred by the decedent (1) may return to his
estate, or (2) may be subject to a power of disposition by him, but
such term does not include a possibility that the income alone from
such property may return to him or become subject to a power of
disposition by him."79 Presumably, the reason that the chance of
income alone reverting to the transferor is excluded from the defini-
tion of a reversionary interest is to prevent a transfer under which
the transferor reserved a contingent life estate from being taxed
under section 2037, if the transfer took place before March 4, 1931,
since transfers before that date are treated as nontaxable by section
2036(b). The "cutoff" date after which a transfer must have been
made to be taxable under section 2037 is September 7, 1916.80
Therefore, if a contingent life estate were regarded as a reversion-
ary interest, it would be possible to tax a transfer under section 2037
that section 2036(b) declares not to be taxable.
Only an interest which meets both the survivorship and the re-
versionary interest requirements under section 2037 will be taxed
under that section. For example, if A transferred property to T
in trust for B for life, remainder to B's surviving children and re-
mainder in default of surviving children to A or A's estate, the
trust property could not be taxed to A's estate under section 2037
because the possession and enjoyment of both B's life estate and
the children's remainder was in no way dependent upon outliving A.
A's reversionary interest, since it was not dependent upon his sur-
vival, might be taxed to his estate under section 2033, but nothing
could be taxed under section 2037. If A had transferred the prop-
erty in question to T in trust for B for life, with a remainder to A
"' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2037(b).
"O INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037(a).
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if he outlived B and a remainder to B's children if B outlived A,
the children's remainder would have been taxable to A's estate
under section 2037, since the possession and enjoyment of the
children was dependent upon outliving A. However, B's life estate
would be excluded from A's gross estate because B's enjoyment
of the trust property is not dependent upon outliving A.
In Goldstone v. United States,8 a man purchased contracts
from an insurance company which he made payable to his wife and
daughters with the proviso that, if he survived his wife and daugh-
ters, the contracts should revert to his estate. Despite the fact that
the wife had the power to cash in the contracts during the decedent's
life and defeat his reversionary interest, the Supreme Court held
that the transfer of the contracts was taxable as a transfer intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the decedent's death.
Section 2037 repudiates the Goldstone case by providing that a
transfer shall not be taxed under that section if there was a general
power of appointment, as defined in section 2041, exercisable at the
decedent's death, by which possession or enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property could be vested in a beneficiary during the decedent's
life. Although the statute does not say so expressly, obviously the
power must be vested in one other than the decedent. Although the
exception to section 2037 was designed as a relief provision, it
could be a tax trap, since the general power necessary to avoid a
tax under the exception to section 2037 would make the property
subject to the power taxable to the donee of the power under both
the estate and gift taxes. For example, if H transferred property
to W in trust to accumulate the income from the trust during H's
life and to distribute the trust property along with the accumulated
income to the surviving children of H and W at H's death, the trust
would not be taxable to H's estate if he gave W power to alter or
amend the trust in any way that she saw fit, provided this power was
outstanding at H's death. If, however, W exercised the power to vest
the trust property in the children during her life, she would incur
a gift tax.82 If she failed to exercise the power and died with the
power outstanding, the trust property would be taxable to her
estate . 3 Moreover, in this instance, if H subsequently died, the
81325 U.S. 687 (1945).
8 'INT. lEV. CODE OF 1954, § 2514.
8 'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
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trust property would also be taxable to his estate under section 2037,
since the power was not exercisable at his death. It would seem that
the danger of additional taxes could be avoided if, instead of giving
W a general power to alter or amend the trust as she saw fit, H
gave her power to terminate the trust in favor of the children.
This would be a special power which would not be taxable under
2041 and would not, therefore, be within the exception to section
2037. However, it would prevent the transfer from meeting the
affirmative requirements for a tax under section 2037 because, due
to the power, the children's possession or enjoyment would no longer
be dependent on surviving H, and since H's reversionary interest
could be destroyed by W at will, it would not be worth more
than five per cent of the value of the transferred property.
8 4
4. Revocable Transfers.-A revocable transfer bears a sufficient
resemblance to the ambulatory aspect of a will to justify its taxation
under an estate tax. It is important to notice, however, that although
section 2038 is headed "revocable transfers," it actually extends to
any transfer where the transferor at his death possessed power,
exercisable alone or in conjunction with any other person, to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate the enjoyment of the transferred
property. Consequently, the Supreme Court held in Porter v. Com-
missioner 5 that a trust under which the decedent retained power to
change the beneficiaries of the trust but could not make himself a
beneficiary was taxable to his estate. A power to terminate a trust
in favor of the beneficiaries of the trust is a taxable power under
section 2038."
Although section 2038 apparently does not reach a power to
alter or revoke a transfer that is vested in one other than the trans-
feror,s 7 it taxes powers exercisable by a decedent alone or in con-
junction with any other person, including a person having a sub-
stantial adverse interest in the transferred property.8 8 Originally,
only reserved powers were taxed under section 2038,89 but this was
changed to provide in the case of transfers after June 22, 1936, for
a tax where the decedent at his death possessed a power to alter or
" Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (3) (1958).
8 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
88Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
, Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945).88 1Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
89 White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
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revoke the transfer "without regard to when or from what source"
the decedent acquired the power."' Although a power the decedent
could only exercise in conjunction with an adverse party is regarded
as a taxable power under section 2038, a trust which could be re-
voked by the decedent only in conjunction with all of the beneficiaries
interested in the trust is treated as an irrevocable transfer not
taxable under section 2038.91 Moreover, according to several Su-
preme Court cases, a trust that can only be altered or revoked by
the settlor of the trust in conjunction with a beneficiary of the trust
will be treated as an irrevocable transfer, which cannot be taxed
constitutionally if the trust was created before the 1924 act which
first taxed revocable transfers. 2 Since there is no cutoff date under
section 2038, a transfer which can be revoked by the transferor
without the concurrence of an adverse party will be taxable regard-
less of when the transfer took place. However, a transfer which
can be revoked only in conjunction with a person possessing a
substantial adverse interest in the transferred property will not be
taxable unless the transfer was made after the 1924 act. The Regula-
tions provide, however, that in the case of such transfers before
the 1924 act only the interest of the beneficiary whose concurrence
is required to exercise the power is excluded from the decedent's
gross estate, upon the theory that the remainder of the transfer is
revocable, since the consent of a person possessing a substantial
adverse interest is not required to revoke that part of the transfer.
93
Section 2038 applies to powers arising by operation of law as
well as those created by the express terms of the instrument of trans-
fer."4 It includes fiduciary powers as long as they are discretionary
powers."' In order to be taxable under section 2038 a power must
be in existence at the decedent's death. Section 2038(b) provides
that the fact that the exercise of a power requires a precedent notice,
which has not been given at the decedent's death, or can take effect
only upon the expiration of a stated period after the exercise of the
power and the power was not exercised before the decedent's death,
"o INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a) (1).
" Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93 (1935).
"Ibid. White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(d) (1958).
" Vaccaro v. United States, 149 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945); Howard
v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942).
" Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1935).
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will not prevent a transfer from being taxed under section 2038.96
According to the Regulations if a power is subject to some other
contingency, such as the decedent's surviving another person, that
has not occurred at the decedent's death, the power will not be taxable
under section 2038, although it may be taxable under section 2036
(a) (2).11 Apparently the Service assumes that by explicitly pro-
viding that certain contingencies will not prevent a power from
being in existence at the decedent's death section 2038 implies that
other contingencies will prevent a tax under that section.
The relation between sections 2038 and 2036(a) (2) raises some
interesting questions. Since a power to designate the possession or
enjoyment of, or the income from, property is also a power to alter
the enjoyment of the property, ordinarily a transfer taxable under
section 2036(a) (2) will also be taxable under section 2038. But
the coverage of the two sections is not precisely coextensive; nor will
the same amount necessarily be taxed under both sections. Since
section 2036(a) (2) is limited to transfers occurring after March
3, 1931, while there is no cutoff date under section 2038, a transfer
before March 4, 1931, that is not taxable under section 2036 may be
taxable under section 2038. Section 2036(a) (2) is limited to
transfers where the taxable power was reserved by the decedent in
connection with the transfer, while section 2038 imposes a tax where
the decedent possessed a taxable power at his death regardless of
the source of the power. According to the Regulations, contingent
powers, except powers subject to the permissible contingencies speci-
fied in section 2038(b), are not taxable under section 2038, while
the fact that a power taxable under section 2036 (a) (2) is subject
to a contingency that has not occurred at the decedent's death will
not prevent a tax under that section. 8 Section 2036(a) (2) taxes
the full value of the property transferred by the decedent possession
or enjoyment of which he retained power to designate; the tax under
section 2038 is limited to the value of the interest subject to the
taxable power. For example, suppose that A during his life trans-
ferred property to T in trust to pay the income to C during C's life
and at C's death to distribute the trust property to D and reserved
" The part of the property which the decedent could not have recovered if
the notice had been given, or the power exercised, on the date of his death
is excluded from his gross estate. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(b).
:7 Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(b) (1958).
98 Ibid.
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power to designate a new beneficiary to receive the income from
the trust during C's life. If A dies survived by C, the full value
of the trust property will be taxed to his estate under section 2036
(a) (2). However, only the value of C's life estate (as of A's
death) will be included in A's gross estate under section 2038.
5. Survivor Annuities.-Section 2039(a) imposes a tax upon
any annuity or other payment receivable by a beneficiary by reason
of surviving a decedent under a contract or agreement entered into
after March 3, 1931 (other than life insurance), if under such con-
tract or agreement an annuity or other payment was payable to
the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such
annuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction with another,
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period that does not in fact end before his
death.
Section 2039(b) limits the amount taxable under section 2039(a)
to a part of the survivor's payments proportionate to the "part of
the purchase price therefor contributed by the decedent." In this
connection any contributions made by the decedent's employer if
made by reason of the decedent's employment are attributed to the
decedent.
Section 2039(c) exempts payments to beneficiaries pursuant to
a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan, along with
certain annuities purchased for their employees by specified charita-
ble organizations. The payments in order to qualify for the ex-
emption under section 2039(c) must be receivable by a beneficiary
other than the decedent's executor or estate. Moreover, the exemp-
tion is limited to a part of the payments proportionate to the con-
tributions of one other than the decedent. In this connection con-
tributions by the decedent's employer are not attributed to the
decedent. Thus, payments under a qualified plan financed wholly
by the decedent's employer are exempt from the estate tax.
Although section 2039 was passed primarily to tax death bene-
fits payable to the beneficiaries of a deceased employee, it also ex-
tends to joint and survivor annuities purchased by a decedent. On
the other hand, although the section is labelled "annuities," it ap-
plies to annuities and "other payments," including lump-sum pay-
ments.
Section 2039 is not a satisfactory section. Although it was
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apparently designed to tax death benefits payable to the survivors
of a deceased employee, it fails to achieve this objective. The fact
that payments under qualified pension and profit-sharing plans are
exempted from the estate tax creates a totally unjustifiable discrim-
ination in favor of the estates of those who are fortunate enough
to qualify for such benefits. Moreover, the tax imposed by section
2039(a) on unqualified plans is subject to various arbitrary limita-
tions which seem to have no better justification than the fact that
section 2039 was for some mysterious reason modelled after section
2036. One of the examples of how section 2039 operates set forth
in the Regulations is an excellent illustration of how inept that
section is. The example in question involves an unqualified retire-
ment plan financed entirely by an employer under which an employee
is to receive half of the amount credited to his account when he re-
tires at age sixty and his designated beneficiary is to receive the other
half of the account at the employee's death, with the further proviso
that if the employee dies before reaching sixty, the full amount in
his account is to be paid to the designated beneficiary. According
to the Regulations, if the decedent dies before age sixty, the amount
credited to his account must be included in his gross estate, since
he had a right to a payment at his death. If, however, he lives until
he is sixty, collects half of the account and dies later, nothing can be
taxed to his estate at his death, because he was not entitled to pay-
ments nor receiving payments at his death. 9 It is difficult to see,
if the purpose of the statute is to tax the death benefits payable at a
decedent's death, any reason for conditioning the tax upon the de-
cedent's right to payments during his life. The insistence of section
2039 upon an interest in the decedent at his death is obviously due
to the fact that section 2039 was modelled after section 2036. This
resemblance finds expression in the fact that section 2039 only
applies to contracts entered into after March 3, 1931, which is also
the magic date under section 2036, and in the further fact that the
specified periods for which the decedent's interest must persist
under section 2039 are the same periods prescribed by section 2036.
It is obvious where the restrictions on the tax imposed by section
2039 came from. It is not obvious why the restrictions imposed by
section 2036 should be imported into section 2039.
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (2), example (5) (1958).
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6. Consideration.-The taxes on inter vivos transfers under the
estate tax are limited to gratuitous transfers. Sections 2035
through 2038 explicitly exclude "a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth." In this con-
text "sale" includes an exchange. Section 2043 (a) provides that a
transfer taxable under sections 2035 through 2038 for an insuffi-
cient consideration shall be taxable only to the extent that the value
of the property transferred exceeds the value of the consideration.
Section 2043 (a) also applies to the exercise or release of a taxable
power of appointment under section 2041, which will be taxed only
to the extent the property subject to the power exceeds the considera-
tion received in connection with the exercise or release of the power.
It is important to remember that the consideration necessary to
prevent a taxable transfer under the estate tax must be more than
a good contractual consideration; it must be "adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth."
The requirement of "money or money's worth" means that the
consideration that will prevent a taxable transfer must be capable
of expression in monetary terms. Thus, marriage or a promise
to marry is not consideration for purposes of the estate tax. ° °
"Adequate and full consideration" means that the consideration
that will prevent a taxable transfer must be the economic equivalent
of the transferred property. According to section 2043 (a) a trans-
fer for an insufficient consideration will only be taxed to the extent
that the value of the transferred property exceeds the value of the
consideration. According to the Regulations, this difference is
computed by taking the difference between the value of the trans-
ferred property on the date at which the estate is valued and the
value of the consideration at the time of the transfer. 10 ' This
means that if A transferred Blackacre to B in contemplation of
death when Blackacre was worth 100,000 dollars for stock then
worth 50,000 dollars and later died when Blackacre was worth
100 Cf. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
101Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1 (a) (1958). See Estate of Vardell v. Com-
missioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962). Perhaps the fairest way to treat
a transfer for an insufficient consideration would be to regard a part of
the property proportionate to the value of the consideration as transferred
for an adequate consideration and limit the tax on the transfer of the
property to the other part of the property. This approach was suggested
in Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 311 U.S. 678 (1940).
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150,000 dollars and the stock had increased in value to 200,000
dollars, 100,000 dollars would be included in A's gross estate because
of the transfer in contemplation of death, assuming that the estate
was valued according to the date of A's death. Since if A still
retained the stock, it would be included in his gross estate at 200,000
dollars, the value of the stock at the date of his death; this seems
unfair. If the decedent owns the consideration received for the
taxable transfer at the date of his death, it would seem that the
consideration for the transfer should be valued according to its fair
market value at the date when the rest of the estate is valued. If
the reason a transfer for a consideration is not taxed under the
estate tax is that the consideration will be taxed and will prevent
the taxable estate from being depleted, it would seem proper to
take the consideration into account to the extent it does prevent
the taxable estate from being depleted.
Whether or not a transfer is for an adequate consideration ob-
viously depends on what is transferred. In United States v. Allen,
10 2
for example, where a woman who had transferred property to a
trust and retained a life interest in the trust released this interest
in contemplation of death for a consideration equal to the value of
the life estate, the Court held that the relinquishment was not a tax-
free transfer for an adequate consideration because what the de-
cedent transferred in contemplation of death was the full value of
the property attributed to her under the estate tax before the release
in contemplation of death, rather than the life estate. This same
reasoning was employed in a somewhat similar situation in Estate
of Vardell v. Commissioner."°3
Section 2043(b) provides that "a relinquishment of dower or
curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy,
or of other marital rights in the decedent's property or estate shall
not be considered to any extent a consideration 'in money or money's
worth'." The relinquishment of marital property rights is not
treated as consideration under the estate tax in order to protect the
integrity of the tax on dower and curtesy and their statutory sub-
stitutes imposed under section 2034.1"' It is not clear whether
102293 F2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
103 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962).
10' Even before § 2043(b) was enacted, it was held that the relinquish-
ment of dower was not an adequate consideration under the estate tax.
Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1938).
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section 2043(b) applies to the relinquishment of marital support
rights. After several cases had held that the relinquishment of
marital support rights was not consideration,0 5 the Treasury issued
a ruling'00 declaring that it would not follow these cases and the
relinquishment of such rights would be regarded as adequate con-
sideration for estate tax purposes up to the value of the relinquished
rights. This ruling has been ignored, however, by some of the sub-
sequent cases.' 0 7
In Commissioner v. Wemyss 08 a man transferred property to
a widow in consideration of her marrying him and forfeiting an
interest she had in a trust created by her first husband. The Su-
preme Court held that he had made a taxable gift under the gift
tax, even though the value of the interest the widow lost under the
trust of her first husband equalled the value of the interest trans-
ferred to her by the second. The Court said that the consideration
that will prevent a taxable transfer under the gift tax must take
the form of a benefit to the donor rather than a detriment to the
donee, since it must be something which will prevent the donor's
taxable estate from being depleted. Although the Wemyss case in-
volved the gift tax, presumably it is also applicable to the estate tax,
and the consideration that will prevent a transfer from being taxed
under the estate tax must take the form of a benefit to the trans-
feror rather than a detriment to the transferee.
7. Constitutional Coimiderations.-When the Supreme Court
held that a conclusive presumption that a transfer within two years
of the transferor's death was unconstitutional in Heiner v. Don-
nan,10 the majority of the court intimated that only testamentary
transfers could be taxed constitutionally under the estate tax. The
court then proceeded to uphold the constitutionality of most of the
taxes upon inter vivos transactions under the estate tax by finding
some sort of testamentary transfer. Thus, for example, the tax
upon transfers in contemplation of death was held to be constitu-
tional upon the theory that the testamentary motive of the trans-
1o Meyer v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
651 (1940); Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 678 (1940).
' E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum!. BULL. 166.
207 Cf. McDonald v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 965 (1956); Robert M. McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956).
210 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
100285 U.S. 312 (1932).
1965] THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 29
feror made the transfer testamentary.' In Helvering v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co.,"'1 the Supreme Court held that a trust that
could be revoked only with the consent of a person possessing a
substantial adverse interest in the trust could be taxed constitu-
tionally. In view of the Court's earlier decisions"12 it would have
been difficult to find a testamentary transfer here. Consequently,
the Court abandoned the testamentary transfer theory and held that
Congress has power to tax any kind of transfers under the estate
tax as long as this is a reasonable method of preventing avoidance
of the tax. In Helvering v. Bullard,"' the Court followed the same
"penumbra" theory144 in upholding the constitutionality of the tax
upon transfers with a retained life interest, although in a more recent
decision upholding the constitutionality of taxing life insurance to
the estate of the insured who had paid premiums for the insurance,
even though he possessed no incidents of ownership in the insurance,
the court seemed again to fall back on the testamentary transfer
theory."
15
Many of the provisions taxing inter vivos transfers under the
estate tax have been retroactive in the sense that they taxed trans-
fers made before the enactment of the tax where the transferor
died after the tax was passed. In an early case, the Supreme Court
held than an irrevocable transfer made before the enactment of any
statute taxing such transfers could not be taxed constitutionally
under a statute enacted after the transfer was made."' However,
the Court also held that a revocable transfer could be taxed, even
"1 Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931). The Court found
some sort of testamentary transfer to uphold the taxes upon life insurance
in Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929); revocable
trusts in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); joint
tenancies in United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); tenancies by
the entirety in Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930); and community
property in Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
... Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
"'See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 319 (1932); May v. Heiner,
281 U.S. 238 (1930); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929)... Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938).
... The expression "penumbra theory" comes from a phrase in Justice
Holmes' dissenting opinion in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 at
241 (1926), where, in arguing for the constitutionality of a state statute
creating a conclusive presumption that a gift within a prescribed period of
the decedent's death was in contemplation of death, he said: "But the law
allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of the
object in order that the object may be secured."
... See United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).... Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
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though the transfer was made before there was a statute taxing the
transfer, on the theory that the lapse of the power when the trans-
feror died after the passage of the taxing act was the taxable trans-
fer, and the tax was not really retroactive. 17 It was also held that an
irrevocable transfer taxable at the time it was made might be taxed
under the higher rates of a later statute in effect at the transferor's
death, on the theory that the transferor was warned of the possi-
bility of a tax by the existence of the statute at the time the transfer
was made, and he should have anticipated a change in rates."" There
are, moreover, several cases that appear to permit a tax upon irre-
vocable transfers made before the taxing act was passed by finding
some sort of taxable transfer at the transferor's death after the
enactment of the statute to avoid the taint of retroactivity." 9 The
truth of the matter seems to be that it is about as unfair not to tax
inter vivos transfers retroactively as it is to tax them retroactively,
since the choice lies between taxing a transfer that was not taxable at
the time the transfer was made or treating decedents who died at the
same time and made the same transfers, although they made them at
different times, differently.
II. T E TAXABLE ESTATE; DEDUCTIONS
The estate tax is computed by multiplying not the gross estate
but the taxable estate by the applicable rates of the tax. The taxable
estate is the difference between the gross estate and the exemption
and the four deductions allowed under the statute for (1) expenses,
indebtedness and taxes; (2) losses; (3) charitable transfers; and
(4) transfers to a surviving spouse.
A. The Exemption
In computing the taxable estate an exemption of 60,000 dollars
is allowed. 20 This means that unless the estate exceeds 60,000
dollars, no estate tax will be due, and if it exceeds that amount, the
first 60,000 dollars will not be taxed. For some obscure reason, the
exemption under the estate tax is not classified as a deduction, as
111 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929). Cf. United
States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
11. Phillips v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U.S. 160 (1931);
Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
11' See United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960);
United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2052.
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it is under the gift tax. However, it has precisely the same effect
as a deduction.
B. Expenses, Indebtedness and Taxes
Section 2053 lumps a number of deductible items together under
the heading of "expenses, indebtedness and taxes." The items
specifically mentioned as deductible under section 2053 include (1)
funeral expenses, (2) administration expenses, (3) claims against
the estate, (4) unpaid mortgages on property included in the gross
estate, and (5) other administration expenses. "Other administra-
tion expenses" mean the expenses of administering property in-
cluded in the taxable but not the probate estate. If, for example, a
decedent during his life transferred property in trust and retained
the right to income for life, the expenses of distributing the trust
property at his death, such as the trustee's commission on principal,
the cost of the final accounting, and counsel fees connected with de-
termining the federal estate tax upon the trust, would be deductible
as "other administration expenses."
Before the 1954 Code, debts and expenses of the estate were
deductible only to the extent there was property in the estate sub-
ject to such claims. This rule has been relaxed by the 1954 Code to
permit such items to be deducted even though they exceed the
property in the estate subject to claims provided that they are paid
before the estate tax return is due. Thus, for example, if a de-
cedent died and left only life insurance which was not subject to
creditors, debts of the decedent and administration expenses actually
paid by the beneficiary of the insurance before the estate tax return
was due would be deductible.
In order to be deductible debts and expenses must be allowable
out of the estate under the laws of the jurisdiction where the estate
is administered. Thus, for example, a debt disallowed by the local
probate court cannot be deducted as a claim against the estate.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether a claim which is a
valid claim at the decedent's death may be deducted if it subsequently
becomes unenforceable, as for example, where the creditor fails to
present his claim within the time for presenting claims to the execu-
tor.'21 There is a somewhat similar uncertainty as to whether a
... Compare Winer v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
and Estate of Feder, 22 T.C. 30 (1954) with Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2
Cum. BULL. 272.
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deductible claim should be valued according to its actuarial value
at the date of the decedent's death, or according to the amount
actually paid to discharge the claim after the decedent's death.,22
Claims founded upon a promise or agreement (including unpaid
mortgages), are deductible only to the extent they were incurred
bona fide for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, although a claim incurred for insufficient consideration will
be deductible up to the amount of the consideration." Considera-
tion here means about the same thing as the consideration that will
prevent a transfer from being taxable under the estate tax. Thus,
the relinquishment of marital property rights, and perhaps even
marital support rights, is not a consideration which will support the
deduction of a claim. The statute expressly provides, however,
that charitable pledges are deductible, as long as the charity is one
to which a deductible bequest might be made, regardless of whether
the pledge is supported by adequate consideration. 24 Apparently,
moreover, the consideration that will support the deduction of a
claim need not take the form of a benefit to the debtor, but may be
a detriment to the creditor. At least the liability of a guarantor or
indorser may be deductible in an appropriate case, although it is
difficult to see any benefit moving to the indorser.
25
Only claims founded on a promise or agreement require con-
sideration to be deductible. Thus, a tort or a tax claim may be de-
ducted irrespective of consideration. An obligation founded upon
an agreement to settle up marital property rights that is incorporated
in a divorce decree is deductible, if the divorce court had jurisdic-
tion to decree a different settlement. 2 The obligation in this case
does not need consideration since it is based upon the divorce
decree rather than the agreement of the spouses.
Although section 2053 is headed "expenses, indebtedness and
taxes," there is no general provision for the deduction of taxes,
"" See Ithaca Trust Co., v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Com-
missioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).
... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(c) (1) (A).
"' Ibid.
Carney v. Benz, 90 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1937). If the decedent's
liability as an indorser is deducted from the gross estate, any rights of re-
imbursement or contribution to which he is entitled must be included in his
gross estate. DuVal's Estate v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946).
Commissioner v. Watson, 216 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1954). Cf. Harris
v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
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which must be deducted ordinarily as claims against the estate. Like
other claims, taxes are deductible only when they represent obliga-
tions of the decedent, as distinguished from liabilities of his estate
arising after his death. 2 7 This is explicitly recognized by the
statutory provision denying any deduction for income taxes on
income received after the death of the decedent or property taxes
not accrued before his death. 2 s This means that any federal income
taxes paid by the executor upon the decedent's returns, on the
income realized by the decedent during his life, are deductible.
However, income taxes paid by his estate are not deductible. In
much the same way, any property taxes that became a lien or ac-
crued before the decedent's death are deductible, while property
taxes accruing after his death are not deductible. The statute ex-
plicitly provides that "any estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance
taxes, shall not be deductible.' 2  However, section 2053(d) subse-
quently makes an exception to this rule in the case of state and
foreign death taxes imposed upon a transfer to charity, which are
deductible provided that the benefit of the deduction inures ex-
clusively to a charity, although not necessarily the charity receiving
the bequest.'30
Administration expenses deductible for purposes of the estate
tax may also be deductible from the estate's income tax as business
expenses or section 212 expenses. Section 64 2 (g) provides, how-
ever, that such expenses cannot be deducted from both taxes, al-
though the expenses may be divided and deducted partly from one
tax and partly from the other. The prohibition of section 6 4 2 (g)
against double deductions does not apply to expenses accrued at the
decedent's death, the so-called "deductions in respect of a decedent"
under section 691(b), which may be deducted from both taxes. It
has also been held that an "other administration expense" connected
with a trust included in the taxable but not the probate estate may be
deducted both from the estate tax and the trust's income tax, on the
ground that the prohibition of section 64 2 (g) against a double
deduction is limited to deducting the same item on the income tax
' But excise taxes incurred in selling or distributing assets of the
estate may be deducted as administration expenses. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-
6(e) (1958).
" INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2053(c) (1) (B).
129 Ibid.
"* INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053 (d).
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return of the estate, not the income tax return of a trust, and the
estate tax.131
C. Losses
Casualty and theft losses incurred during the settlement of an
estate are deductible from the estate tax.13 2 Since these items may
also be deducted from the estate's income tax, section 642(g)
prohibits deducting them from both taxes.
D. Charitable Transfers
Section 2055 provides that "bequests, legacies, devises, or
transfers" to the governmental and charitable organizations speci-
fied in that section shall be deductible. The only limitation on the
deduction of charitable transfers under the estate tax is that the
property transferred to the charity must be included in the gross .
estate of the decedent. The charitable transfers that are deductible
under the estate tax include inter vivos transfers, although, of
course, in order to qualify for the deduction, the transferred property
must be included in the transferor's gross estate.3 Thus, for ex-
ample, a transfer to charity in contemplation of death or a revocable
transfer to charity would be deductible under the estate tax.
Ordinarily, only transfers to charity by the decedent will be
deductible in computing his taxable estate. The statute provides,
however, that any interest passing to charity by virtue of a disclaimer
qualifies for the charitable deduction. 34 Moreover, when an un-
exercised power to consume or invade property terminates because
of the death of the donee of the power before the estate tax return
is due, this will be treated as an irrevocable disclaimer of the power.'35
For example, suppose that A died and left his estate in trust for his
wife for life, remainder to charity, and also empowered his wife
to withdraw any amounts of principal she desired for her happiness
or comfort. The charitable remainder would not be deductible be-
cause of the widow's power to divert the property from the charity.
If, however, the widow disclaimed her power, or if she died within
fifteen months of the decedent's death without exercising the
power, the remainder would qualify for the charitable deduction.
lfl Commissioner v. Burrow Trust, 333 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1964).
z INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2054.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055 (d).
x" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 2055 (a).
Ibid.
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If she disclaimed her life estate also, with the result that the entire
property passed to the charity, the life estate as well as the remainder
would qualify for the charitable deduction. The death of the widow
within fifteen months of the decedent's death would not operate as
a disclaimer of the life estate, however, since death is only treated
as a disclaimer of a power to invade or consume property.
Any property passing to charity that is included in the estate
of a donee of a taxable power of appointment over the property is
treated by the statute as passing from the donee to the charity
and is deductible from the donee's gross estate."8 6 Ordinarily in
this case the property would not be treated as passing from the
donor of the power to the charity so as to entitle his estate to a
charitable deduction. There is, however, a weird provision under
the statute designed to take care of a special case, under which
property left to a surviving spouse over eighty years of age at the
decedent's death may, if the surviving spouse is entitled to the
income from the property during her life and has power to appoint
the property to charity, be treated as passing from the decedent
to charity, if certain statutory conditions are met.
3 7
Contingent gifts to charity do not qualify for the charitable
deduction 3 ' unless the condition is negligible, so that there is no
chance that the charity will not take the property.13 9 Moreover, a
charitable gift will not be deductible if someone possesses power to
divert the property from the charity unless it can be determined,
because the power is subject to objective limitations, that there will
be no such diversion or that any possible diversion will be in an
ascertainable amount under the facts of the particular case.
40
The deduction for a charitable transfer must be reduced by any
death taxes payable out of the property passing to the charity.'
4 1
The competent draftsman will make sure that no taxes are payable
... INT. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2055(b) (1).
"' INT. REV. CODa OF 1954, § 2055 (b) (2).
.88 Sternberger v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 187 (1955); Humes v. United
States, 276 U.S. 487 (1928).
.. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934). See
Empire Trust Co. v. United States, 64-1 USTC q 12,219 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
aff'd mem., 299 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1962).
1 "'Compare Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929)
with Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943) and
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595 (1949).
1' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055 (c) ; Harrison v. Northern Trust Co.,
317 U.S. 476 (1943).
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out of a charity's share in order to prevent diminution of the charita-
ble deduction and to escape the mathematical dilemma which may
arise where death taxes are payable out of a gift to charity and the
amount of the federal estate tax depends upon the amount of the
charitable deduction, while the amount of the charitable deduction
depends on the amount of the tax.
E. Transfers to a Surviving Spouse; the Marital Deduction
1. Amount of the Deduction.-In an effort to equalize the im-
pact of the estate tax upon married couples in community property
and common-law states, section 2056 of the Code provides that
any property passing from a deceased to a surviving spouse out-
right, or by an equivalent form of disposition, is deductible from
the decedent's gross estate up to one-half of his adjusted gross
estate. One-half of the adjusted gross estate is, of course, a ceiling
on the marital deduction, not a floor. If a man leaves less than half
of his adjusted gross estate to his surviving spouse, the marital de-
duction will be limited to the amount she actually receives.
The adjusted gross estate, which furnishes the ceiling for the
marital deduction, is the gross estate less the deductions allowed
for expenses, indebtedness and taxes by section 2053 and losses by
section 2054. If community property is involved, the value of the
decedent's interest in community property must also be subtracted
from his gross estate to ascertain his adjusted gross estate. In this
case since the community property is not included in the adjusted
gross estate, part of the section 2053 and 2054 deductions equal
to the ratio between the community property and the gross estate
is not subtracted from the gross estate to get the adjusted gross
estate.
Because only section 2053 and 2054 deductions are subtracted
from the gross estate to get the adjusted gross estate, it is possible
to avoid the estate tax entirely by combining the marital deduction
with some other deduction. Thus, for example, a man with an
estate of 120,000 dollars may avoid the estate tax by leaving half
of his estate to his wife and passing the other half tax-free under
the 60,000-dollar exemption. The estate tax on an estate of any
size may be avoided by leaving half of the estate to a surviving
spouse and the other half to charity.
Only the expenses and losses which are deducted for purposes
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of the estate tax, as distinguished from the income tax of the estate,
are subtracted from the gross estate to get the adjusted gross estate.
This means that if there is a formula gift to a surviving spouse in
terms of the maximum marital deduction to which the decedent's
estate is entitled, or fifty per cent of his adjusted gross estate, the
amount passing to the surviving spouse and qualifying for the
marital deduction may be increased by deducting expenses from the
estate's income tax instead of the estate tax. Since the adjusted
gross estate is increased by taking these deductions against the
estate income tax and one-half of this increase is reflected in the
marital deduction, the taxable estate will only be increased to the
extent of half of the expenses and losses taken against the income
tax.
Any obligations imposed on the surviving spouse and any death
taxes payable out of the property passing to her reduce the amount
of the marital deduction.142 Consequently the careful draftsman will
provide for the payment of taxes out of some other part of the
estate in order to prevent reduction of the marital deduction and
possibly encountering the mathematical dilemma in computing the
tax where the amount of the tax depends upon the amount of the
deduction and the amount of the deduction depends on the amount
of the tax.
2. Requirements for the Deduction.-The two principal require-
ments for the marital deduction are that an interest in property must
pass from the decedent to the surviving spouse and this interest
must not be a nondeductible terminable interest.
An interest in property passes to a surviving spouse whenever
the decedent transferred property to the surviving spouse, or she
acquired the property in any way which is treated as a taxable
transfer under the estate tax. 43 Thus property acquired by a
surviving spouse by survivorship, or as the beneficiary of an in-
surance policy, or by virtue of the exercise or nonexercise of a
power of appointment passes to the surviving spouse. An interest
in property must not only pass to a surviving spouse, but it must
also be included in the gross estate of the deceased spouse.144 Con-
sequently, even though an interest passes to a surviving spouse, it
I, TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (4).
I TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(e).
144 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
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will not qualify for the marital deduction unless it was included
in the deceased spouse's estate.
Property acquired by a surviving spouse by virtue of a dis-
claimer does not pass to the surviving spouse. Nor does an interest
that the surviving spouse disclaims.' 45 Any interest which a sur-
viving spouse takes in her husband's estate as her distributive share
of the estate when she elects to take against his will passes to the
surviving spouse and qualifies for the marital deduction, provided
it is not a nondeductible terminable interest.'4 This is also true of
any interest in the deceased spouse's estate that the surviving spouse
takes as the result of a bona fide will contest.
1 4 7
One may get a marital deduction by inserting a provision in his
will providing that if it is impossible to determine whether he or
his spouse survived, it shall be presumed that the spouse survived.
If property passes to a spouse under such a clause under the local
property law, it qualifies for the marital deduction. 48
Nondeductible terminable interests do not qualify for the marital
deduction. 149 The reason for the rule is that a surviving spouse in
a community property state takes her share of the community
property outright, and it is usually exposed to an estate tax at her
death. Consequently, the draftsmen of the marital deduction limited
the interests qualifying for the marital deduction to interests passing
to a surviving spouse outright, or by an equivalent form of dis-
position, that are exposed to a tax in the estate of the surviving
spouse.
A terminable interest is an interest that may terminate or fail
other than a bond, note or similar contractual obligation the dis-
charge of which will not have the effect of an annuity for life or
for a term.' Thus, a patent or copyright, or an estate for life or
for a term of years is a terminable interest. A determinable fee
simple is also a terminable interest, since an interest will be ter-
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d).
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(c) (1958). A cash allowance in lieu of
common law dower qualifies for the marital deduction according to First
Nat'l Exch. Bank v. United States, 335 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1964); Dougherty
v. United States, 292 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Crosby,
257 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 248
F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1957). Contra, Rev. Rul. 279, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 275.
1"Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d) (1958).
..8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(e) (1958).
"
0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1).%5O Ibid.
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minable if it may terminate or fail; it need not necessarily terminate
or fail.
Terminable interests qualify for the marital deduction unless
they meet one of several statutory conditions. Thus, for example,
if a man left his wife a patent or copyright, the bequest would
qualify for the marital deduction. The conditions that a terminable
interest must meet to be nondeductible are (1) someone else must
have acquired an interest in the property in which the surviving
spouse took a terminable interest from the decedent for less than
adequate consideration, and by virtue of this interest it must be
possible for this person (or his heirs or assigns) to possess or enjoy
the property when the surviving spouse's interest terminates or
fails; or (2) the terminable interest is to be acquired for the sur-
viving spouse pursuant to the directions of the decedent by his
executor or the trustee of a trust. 1r
The typical example of a nondeductible terminable interest is
the devise of a life estate to a surviving spouse with a remainder
over to children. On the other hand, if life estates were left to the
children with the remainder in fee to the widow, her interest would
not be a terminable interest and consequently not a nondeductible
terminable interest. A bequest of a patent to a surviving spouse
qualifies for the marital deduction. It is a bequest of a terminable
interest but not a nondeductible terminable interest, since no one
other than the surviving spouse takes an interest in the patent. If
a man left a patent to his wife and son as tenants in common, the
gift to the wife would still qualify for the marital deduction. In
this case the son would also take an interest in the patent, but his
interest would cease along with his mother's, so that he could not
enjoy the patent when her interest terminated. If a man died and
left money to his executor with directions to invest this sum in an
annuity for his widow, the widow's interest would be a nonde-
ductible terminable interest, not because anyone else took an interest
in the annuity, but because it was to be acquired for her. If the
decedent had purchased a joint and survivor annuity for himself
and his wife, however, the value of the survivor annuity of the
widow would qualify for the marital deduction. Although the
widow's interest in the annuity is a terminable interest, it is not
nondeductible because no one else takes any interest in it, and it
251 Ibid.
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is not to be acquired for her. If a man left 10,000 dollars to his
executor with directions to buy first mortgages for his wife, the
gift to the wife would not be a terminable interest and would qualify
for the marital deduction, unless the executor was to invest in a
mortgage which paid off in equal annual installments. The dis-
charge of the mortgage would take the form of an annuity for
years; it would, therefore, be a terminable interest under the
statute, and a nondeductible interest since it was to be acquired
for the widow by the executor.
152
The statute carries the nondeductible terminable interest rule
to the extent of requiring any interest passing to a surviving spouse
that may be satisfied out of a group of assets that includes a non-
deductible terminable interest to be reduced by the value of the
nondeductible interest in determining the value of the property
passing to the surviving spouse that qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion.153
3. Exceptions to the Nondeductible Terminable Interest Rule.-
There are three exceptions to the nondeductible terminable interest
rule, that is, three interests that would be nondeductible terminable
interests under the general definition, but are explicitly made de-
ductible by the statute.
The fact than an interest passing to a surviving spouse is con-
tingent upon her not dying as a result of a common disaster from
which the decedent died, or upon her surviving the decedent for not
more than six months, will not prevent property from qualifying
for the marital deduction, if the property actually passes to the
surviving spouse.'54 If, however, a surviving spouse must survive
an event which may or may not happen in six months, the interest
passing to the surviving spouse will not qualify for the marital
deduction, even though the event actually happens within six months
of the decedent's death.'
5
The most important exception to the nondeductible terminable
interest rule is the life-estate power-of-appointment exception under
which property passing to a surviving spouse qualifies for the
1" Ibid.
... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (2).
x INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (3).
'D' Kaspar v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954). Cf. Kellar v. Kaspar,
138 F. Supp. 738 (D. S.D. 1956).
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marital deduction if she is entitled to the income from the property
at annual or more frequent intervals for her life and has an un-
qualified power to appoint the property to herself or her estate that
she can exercise without the concurrence of any other person, and
no one possesses power to appoint the property away from the
surviving spouse.'5 6 Originally this execption was limited to gifts
in trust for a surviving spouse and only operated when the surviving
spouse was entitled to all of the income from the trust property and
had power to appoint the entire property. The statute was subse-
quently amended, however, to extend the exception to legal gifts as
well as gifts in trust. Moreover, a pro tanto deduction was allowed
where the surviving spouse was entitled to. the income from only
a specific portion of the property left by the decedent and had
power to appoint this specific portion.
The most common instance of the life-estate power-of-appoint-
ment exception to the terminable interest rule occurs in connection
with a marital deduction trust where a surviving spouse is given the
income from the trust for life and a power to appoint the remainder
to herself or her estate. It is also possible to qualify property for the
marital deduction by means of an "estate trust" under which the
trust property is left to the surviving spouse's estate.
7 Since in
the case of the estate trust no one other than the surviving spouse
or her estate takes any interest in the trust property, the estate
trust qualifies for the marital deduction since the surviving spouse's
interest is not a nondeductible terminable interest. It is not neces-
sary to meet the technical requirements of the life-estate power-of-
appointment exception to the nondeductible terminable interest rule
to qualify an estate trust for the deduction.
The final exception to the nondeductible terminable interest rule
relates to insurance settlements, under which insurance on the life
of a deceased spouse is left with the insurer under an agreement to
pay the surviving spouse interest on the proceeds of the insurance
or to pay her the proceeds in installments. Such settlements qualify
for the marital deduction if all payments made during the surviving
spouse's life must be made to the surviving spouse annually or at
more frequent intervals, and she has an unqualified power, exer-
cisable alone, to appoint to herself or her estate any balance re-
... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(b) (1) (ii) (1958).
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maining due at her death.' The conditions that the insurance settle-
ment exception must meet are substantially the same as those of the
life-estate power-of-appointment exception with the additional re-
quirement that payments under the insurance settlement must start
Within thirteen months of the decedent's death.
III. VALUATION
Although the federal estate tax is imposed upon the transfer of
property, it is measured by the value of the property transferred.
Consequently, a necessary step in the computation of the tax involves
the valuation of the property included in the gross estate along with
any property qualifying for the charitable and marital deductions.
The value of property changes from time to time. Therefore,
the first step in valuation is to fix the date as of which property is
to be valued. Generally property is valued for purposes of the fed-
eral estate tax according to its fair market value at the date of the
decedent's death. Under section 2032, however, the executor may
elect to value the estate according to an alternate valuation date,
provided he makes the election upon the estate tax return filed by
the due date for the return.
If the alternate valuation date is elected, the property in the
estate will be valued according to its fair market value one year
after the date of the decedent's death, "9 with the exception of
property distributed or disposed of before that time. Property dis-
tributed or disposed of during the year after the decedent's death is
valued according to its fair market value at the date of such dis-
tribution or disposition.}'6
Changes in value due to lapse of time are ignored in valuing
property according to the alternate valuation date ;16 and, in the
case of property passing under the marital and charitable deductions,
any differences in value due to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
a contingency after the decedent's death are also ignored.'6 2 Any
deductions, such as casualty losses during the settlement of the
estate, that are reflected in the alternate date valuation are disallowed
when this valuation date is elected.'6
.. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (6).
... INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 2032(a) (2).
... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032(a) (1).
... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032(a) (3).
... INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2032(b).
'a Ibid.
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The statute is silent about the standard employed in valuing
property for purposes of the estate tax except for a provision that
in valuing unlisted securities quotations for similar listed securities
must be taken into account.-" 4 According to the Regulations, prop-
erty must be valued according to its fair market value, which is
defined as the price that a willing buyer, under no pressure to buy,
would pay a willing seller, under no pressure to sell.' 65 The Regula-
tions amplify this definition with examples of specific valuation
problems. 6 They also contain tables for valuing limited interests,
such as annuities, life estates, terms for years, and remainders and
reversions. 6 7 Ordinarily taxpayers will be bound by these tables,
although exceptions may be made where valuation is dependent
upon the life expectancy of a person having an abnormal life ex-
pectancy'8 or the income yield of property which differs radically
from the interest rate assumed by the tables.' Theoretically valua-
tion involves foresight rather than hindsight. There are several
cases, however, that have permitted interests to be valued by taking
into consideration events occurring after the valuation date.Y7
IV. COMPUTATION OF T]HE TAX
The gross estate tax is computed by multiplying the taxable
estate by the rates of the tax. The net tax actually due the gov-
ernment is the gross tax less any applicable credits against the tax.
Four credits are allowed against the estate tax.
Section 2011(b) allows state death taxes to be credited against
the federal estate tax within the limits prescribed by that section.
Before the 1954 Code, the credit for state death taxes was limited
to eighty per cent of the "basic" federal estate tax. When the 1954
Code combined the basic and additional estate taxes into a single
schedule of rates, the credit for state death taxes was still limited
to an amount equal to eighty per cent of the old basic tax by section
' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031 (b).
... Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
... Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2 to -6, -8 (1958).
': Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958).
6'Estate of Nellie H. Jennings, 10 T.C. 323 (1948); Estate of John
Halliday Denbigh, 7 T.C. 387 (1946).
... Hanley v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 73 (Ct. Cl. 1945). An interest
rate different than that assumed by the Treasury Tables cannot be employed
if it is possible to reinvest the property being valued in securities returning
a different rate of interest. Estate of Irma E. Green, 22 T.C. 728 (1954).
..O See Estate of Vardell v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962);
Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).
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2011(b). The reason no credit is allowed under section 2011(b)
until the taxable estate exceeds 40,000 dollars is that the exemption
under the basic tax was 100,000 dollars or 40,000 dollars higher
than the current exemption of 60,000 dollars.
The same transfer may be taxed under both the estate and gift
taxes. Consequently, section 2012 allows any federal gift tax im-
posed upon transfers included in the transferor's gross estate to be
credited against the transferor's estate tax, within the limits pre-
scribed by that section.
Section 2014 allows foreign death taxes to be credited against
the federal estate tax subject to the limitations set forth in that
section.
The credits allowed under sections 2011, 2012, and 2014 are
designed to prevent double taxes upon the same transfers. Section
2013, which allows a credit for prior federal estate taxes, affords
relief from too many estate taxes in too short a time, rather than
from multiple taxes on the same transfer. According to section
2013, the estate of a decedent who acquired property from another
decedent who died within ten years before or two years after the
decedent's death 171 is allowed a credit for the estate tax paid upon the
property by the estate of the prior decedent. The credit for prior
estate taxes is based upon a sliding scale by which the amount of
the credit diminishes as the interval between the deaths of the two
decedents increases. For example, if the deaths occurred within two
years of each other, one hundred per cent of the tax paid upon the
property acquired from the prior decedent by the prior decedent's
estate may be credited against the decedent's estate tax. If the
deaths are more than eight years but less than ten years apart, the
credit is limited to twenty per cent of the tax paid by the prior
decedent's estate. If more than ten years elapses between the two
deaths, no credit at all is allowed.
V. PAYMENT AND COLLECTION OF THIE TAX
When a citizen or a resident of the United States dies leaving
a gross estate worth more than 60,000 dollars at the date of his
death, a preliminary notice (Form 704) must be filed within two
"" Credit for a tax paid by the estate of a decedent dying after the
decedent's death would be allowed where the property was included in the
transferor decedent's estate because he made a taxable transfer, such as a
transfer in contemplation of death.
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months of his death with the District Director of Internal Revenue
in whose district the decedent was domiciled. If an executor or
administrator is appointed within two months of the decedent's
death, the time for filing the preliminary notice is extended for two
months after his appointment. If, however, no executor or ad-
ministrator is appointed within two months of the decedent's death,
the preliminary notice must be filed by any person in actual or con-
structive possession of property included in the decedent's gross
estate. A similar notice (Form 705) is required in the case of non-
resident aliens who die leaving a gross estate situated in the United
States worth more than 2,000 dollars at the date of death. The pre-
liminary notice when a nonresident alien dies is filed with the Di-
rector of International Operations, Internal Revenue Service, Wash-
ington 25, D. C.
In addition to the preliminary notice, a federal estate tax return
(Form 706) must be filed within fifteen months of the death of a
citizen or resident of the United States whose gross estate exceeded
60,000 dollars at the date of his death. The final return is filed by
the same persons and with the same persons as the preliminary notice.
An estate tax return (Forms 706NA and 706) must also be filed
within fifteen months of the death of a nonresident alien who left
a gross estate in the United States worth more than 2,000 dollars at
the time of his death.
The tax is due and payable at the due date of the return. In
appropriate cases extensions of time for filing returns may be
granted, but an extension of time for filing a return does not extend
the time for paying the tax. If, however, payment of the tax would
involve undue hardship, and in certain situations where remainders
and reversions and business interests are involved, extensions of
time for paying the tax may be granted.172
Except in the case of proceeds of insurance and property subject
to a taxable power of appointment, the federal estate tax does not
specify who shall bear the ultimate burden of the tax, but leaves
this to the local state law. Sections 2206 and 2207 provide that the
beneficiary of life insurance and the recipient of property subject
to a taxable power of appointment shall bear the proportionate share
of the estate tax imposed upon these interests in the absence of a
... See LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAxEs, 555-57
(2d ed. 1962).
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contrary provision in the decedent's will. Insurance and property
subject to a power of appointment passing under the marital deduc-
tion are exempt from this obligation. Apart from sections 2206
and 2207, the federal statute leaves the determination of who is
ultimately to bear the burden of the federal estate tax to any
provisions in the decedent's will and, in the absence of such pro-
visions, to the local law. In some states, in the absence of a contrary
direction in the decedent's will, the federal estate tax is charged
against the residue of his estate, with proportionate abatement in
the shares of the other beneficiaries of the estate if the residue is
insufficient to meet the estate tax. Other states have apportionment
statutes under which the burden of the federal estate tax is appor-
tioned among the benficiaries of the estate according to the value
of their respective interests in the estate.
THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX
The federal gift tax, like the federal estate tax, is a tax upon
the privilege of transferring property, rather than a tax upon the
property transferred. It differs from the estate tax in that it is
confined to inter vivos transfers. Since the gift tax is an indirect
tax upon the privilege of transferring property rather than a direct
tax upon the property transferred, Congress has constitutional
authority to impose an unapportioned gift tax.' The doctrine of
intergovernmental immunities does not apply to the gift tax.'
74
Nor do statutory tax exemptions extend to gift taxes upon the
transfer of exempt property.
7 5
The current gift tax was enacted in 1932. Congress passed a
gift tax in 1924, which was repealed in 1926 after it proved quite
ineffective because the tax was computed upon an annual rather than
a cumulative basis and allowed an annual exemption of 50,000 dol-
lars. The Supreme Court held that the 1924 tax was constitutional, 76
although the Court also held that it could not be applied consti-
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
174 Blodgett v. Holden, 11 F.2d 180 (W.D. Mich. 1926), rev'd on other
grounds, 275 U.S. 142 (1927) ; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958).
1
7 5 Phipps v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 742 (1937); Hamersley v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 768 (Ct.
Cl. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 659 (1937); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a)
(1958)."'Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
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tutionally to a gift made before the tax was enacted. 
1 7
7 Out of
deference to the decision in Untermyer v. Anderson1ts against a
retroactive gift tax, Congress was careful to confine the 1932 tax
to gifts made after the tax was passed. Moreover, the various
amendments to the 1932 tax have provided expressly that they were
applicable only to gifts made after the amendments were enacted.
The 1932 tax avoided the structural defects of the 1924 tax by
limiting the exemption under the tax to a single lifetime exemption
and requiring the tax to be computed upon a cumulative basis. Al-
though the tax is confined to the gifts made during the taxable
year, the rate of tax is determined by the taxpayer's total gifts
since the enactment of the tax in 1932.
The stated purposes of the 1924 and 1932 gift taxes were to
prevent avoidance of the estate and income taxes." 9 The gift tax
fails to achieve either of these objectives. Due to the rate differen-
tial between the two taxes, the gift tax is not an effective deterrent
to inter vivos gifts to get property out of the donor's taxable estate.
Although nominally the rates of the gift tax are three-fourths of
those of the estate tax, actually the effective rates of the gift tax
are usually very much lower. Ordinarily, inter vivos gifts come off
the top of the donor's taxable estate and fall into a much lower
bracket under the gift tax. They also enable the donor to take ad-
vantage of the exemption and any exclusions under the gift tax.
Finally, the estate tax is computed on a tax base which includes the
amount of the tax itself, while the gift tax is calculated upon the
amount actually passing to the donee."'8  The gift tax seldom dis-
courages transfers of income-producing property in order to split
up a large income taxable in a high bracket into smaller incomes
taxable in lower brackets because income tax savings are recurrent
annual savings, while the gift tax penalty is incurred only once.
I. GRoss GiFTs
The easiest approach to the gift tax is to consider the various
steps in the computation of the tax. The tax is imposed upon gifts
"" Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928). Cf. Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U.S. 142 (1927).
"8 Supra note 177.
1 See LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 172, at 564.
"' For example, an unmarried man who had a taxable estate of $1,000,000
and who had made no previous gifts could escape an estate tax of $35,000
at the cost of a gift tax of $8,595 if he gave $100,000 to a single donee
during his life.
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made during the calendar year. The first step in computing the tax
is to list the taxpayer's gifts during the year in excess of any ex-
clusions allowed against the gifts, to determine his gross gifts.
A. The Annual Exclusion
The taxpayer's gross gifts may differ from his total gifts be-
cause of the annual exclusion. In the case of gifts of present in-
terests, the first 3,000 dollars of the gifts to each donee during the
taxable year is excluded from the gross gifts.'81 Thus, if a man gave
10,000 dollars to each of his three sons in a single year, he would
get an exclusion of 3,000 dollars for the gift to each son. His total
exclusions would be 9,000 dollars and his gross gifts 21,000 dollars.
From 1932 through 1938 the exclusion was 5,000 dollars. In 1939
it was reduced to 4,000 dollars, and since 1943 it has been 3,000
dollars.
The principal problem in connection with the exclusion is what
is a future interest, since no exclusion is allowed for a gift of a
future interest.'8 2 For gift tax purposes future interests include not
only remainders and reversions, but any interest possession or enjoy-
ment of which is deferred or subject to the will of some person
other than the owner of the interest.',3 Although the stated reason
for denying any exclusion to gifts of future interests was the an-
ticipated difficulty in determining the donee of the gift and the value
of his interest," 4 the fact that a donee is easily identifiable and the
value of his interest precisely ascertainable will not make a gift a gift
of a present interest, if the donee's possession or enjoyment is
deferred. For example, if A transferred property to T in trust to
accumulate the income from the property for ten years and then
to distribute the trust property along with any accumulated income
to B or B's estate, the gift to B would be a gift of a future interest.
A gift will be a gift of a future interest even though it is pos-
sible for the donee to obtain the present enjoyment of the interest,
if his possession or enjoyment is dependent upon the will of some
other person. In Heringer v. Conzmissioner,85 for example, the
"I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
182 Ibid.
... See Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); Treas. Reg. §
25.2503-3 (1958).
8' H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. p. 39 (1932); S. REP. No.
665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 41 (1932).- 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956).
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court said that if a gift to a corporation were viewed as a group of
gifts to the individual stockholders of the corporation, the gifts to
the stockholders would be gifts of future interests, since no indi-
vidual stockholder could liquidate the corporation and obtain pos-
session of the donated property without the consent of the other
stockholders, so that his enjoyment depended upon the will of the
other stockholders.
According to the Regulations, the term "future interest"
has no reference to such contractual rights as exist in a bond,
note (though bearing no interest until maturity), or in a policy
of life insurance, the obligations of which are to be discharged
by payments in the future. But a future interest or interests in
such contractual obligations may be created by the limitations
contained in a trust or other instrument of transfer used in
effecting a gift. 8 6
If a man completely assigns his life insurance, this will be treated
as a gift of a present interest, even though the insurance has not
yet acquired a cash surrender value.'8 7 Of course, if he limits the
assignment in a fashion inconsistent with the assignee's present
enjoyment, the assignment will be a gift of a future interest. Thus,
where a man transferred his insurance to his two sons jointly, the
court held that the sons took future interests in the insurance, since
neither son could cash in the policy without the consent of the
other."" If, after assigning life insurance, a man continues to pay
the premiums on the insurance, whether the premium payments
constitute gifts of future or present interests depends upon whether
the assignment of the policy itself gave the assignee a future or
present interest. 8 9
According to section 2503(c), a gift to an infant will qualify
for the exclusion, if the donated property and the income therefrom
may be expended for the infant before he attains age twenty-one,
and any unexpended balance will pass to the infant when he reaches
twenty-one, or to his estate or as he may appoint under a general
power of appointment, if he dies under that age. For example, if A
transferred property to T in trust for the benefit of B, who was
1.6 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1958).
... Rev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 113.
... Skouras v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951).
... If the gift of the insurance policy gave the donee a present interest
in the policy, payment of a premium will also be a gift of a present interest.
See LowNDEs & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 172, at 730-31.
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ten years old and empowered T to accumulate the income from the
trust or expend income and principal for B's benefit until B reached
twenty-one, at which time T was directed to pay over an unexpended
balance to B, with a further direction to pay the balance to B's
estate if B died before reaching twenty-one, this would be a gift
of a present interest which would qualify for the annual exclusion.
Section 2503(c) is not exclusive. Apart from this section, a
gift to an infant will be a gift of a present interest if it is a present
interest under the general definition of a present interest. Thus,
an outright gift to an infant or to a guardian for an infant is a
gift of a present interest.'90 So, according to some cases, is a gift
to an infant in trust where the trustee is required to hold the prop-
erty as a guardian.' An interest in the income from a trust that
must be distributed to or expended for an infant will be a gift of
a present interest to the extent of the value of the income interest.
92
There is a split of authority whether a gift to a trust under which
the trustee is to accumulate income for an infant until his majority
will be converted into a gift of a present interest by a provision in
the trust authorizing the infant or his guardian to terminate the
trust at any time he sees fit.'9 3
An exclusion will not be allowed for a gift of a present interest
unless the value of the interest can be ascertained with sufficient
certainty to determine the amount of the exclusion allowable. If a
minimum value for the interest can be ascertained, the Service has
ruled that an exclusion will be allowed to the extent of the minimum
value." 4 Several cases held that a gift of a present interest in in-
come would not qualify for the annual exclusion where someone
possessed power to invade principal in behalf of the income bene-
ficiary, upon the curious reasoning that this would make the value of
the income interest uncertain,' 95 although obviously the exercise
of the power could only increase the present enjoyment of the
.0 Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 319.
101 United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956); Cannon v.
Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W.D.N.C. 1951); Strekalovsky v. Delaney,
78 F. Supp 556 (D. Mass. 1948).
102 See LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 172, at 726.
101 Compare Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951)
with Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
10, Rev. Rul. 55-678, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 389.
' °La Fortune v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Estate
of Herrmann v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1956); Evans v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1952).
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holder of the present interest. Section 2503(b) of the 1954 Code
repudiated these decisions by providing that the existence of a
power to invade principal in favor of the holder of a present in-
terest shall be disregarded in determining the eligibility of the
present interest for the exclusion, where the power cannot be exer-
cised in favor of anyone else. Of course, a power to destroy a
present interest by diverting property to one other than the possessor
of the present interest would make the value of the present interest
uncertain and prevent it from qualifying for the exclusion.'
B. Elements of a Taxable Gift
The Code does not undertake to define the gifts which are tax-
able under the gift tax. Section 2501 imposes the tax "on the
transfer of property by gift . . . by any individual." Section
2512(b), which deals with valuation, says: "Where property is
transferred for less than adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the prop-
erty exceeds the value of the consideration shall be deemed a
gift . . . ." The following definition of a taxable gift may be in-
ferred from statutory fragments like these, Treasury rulings, and
court decisions: A taxable gift is a voluntary and complete transfer
of property by an individual for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, which is not a bona fide
business transfer. The two principal elements of a gift are (1) a
transfer of property, (2) for less than adequate consideration.
It will be convenient to consider the nature of a taxable gift under
these headings.
1. Transfer.-A taxable gift involves a transfer of property.
Thus, a true disclaimer of a bequest under a will is not a gift,'
since it is simply a refusal to accept the property bequeathed by the
decedent and not a transfer of property. On the other hand, re-
nunciation of an interest in an intestate estate by an heir was held
to be a gift where title to the interest vested automatically in the
heir under the local law at the decedent's death, and the renuncia-
19 See Funkhouser's Trusts v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 804 (1960).
" Cf. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290
U.S. 641 (1933).
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tion was, therefore, a transfer of this interest, rather than simply a
refusal to accept an interest in the estate. 9 s
A gift may be made in any way in which property can be trans-
ferred. Delivery is not necessary for a gift, unless in the particular
situation transfer of title depends on delivery.'99 Thus, a taxable
gift may be made by a declaration of trust, release of a power to re-
voke a trust, irrevocably naming a beneficiary of an insurance policy,
or gratuitously cancelling a debt.
2 0
A taxable gift involves a transfer of property as distinguished
from a gift of services. If an executor waives his commissions
before he begins to serve, this is not a taxable gift.2 0' He has ren-
dered services to the beneficiaries of the estate gratuitously rather
than made a gift of his commissions. Some interesting questions
have arisen under the income tax with regard to the distinction
between a gift of services and a gift of property, which might well
arise under the gift tax. If an artist paints a picture and gives it
to a friend, has he made a gift of property or services ?202 Would
it make a difference if the friend furnished the canvas and paints for
the picture?
The gift tax is limited to gifts "by any individual." This ex-
cludes gifts by corporations. The Regulations provide, however,
that gifts by corporations will be taxed as gifts by the individual
stockholders of the corporation.20 3 The statute says nothing about
gifts to corporations. There is some uncertainty about whether a
gift to a corporation is a single gift to the corporate entity or a group
of gifts to the individual stockholders. 0 The way in which the gift
is viewed should not make any difference as far as the amount of
the gift is concerned. If the donor is one of the stockholders and the
gift is treated as gifts to the stockholders, there will be no gift of
the donor's proportionate share of the donated property, since a
.Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 836 (1952); William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
... See Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1942).
0 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (1958).
.01 Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 21. There may be a taxable
gift, however, if he waives the commissions after they have been earned.
Rev. Rul. 64-225, 1964-2 Cum!. BuLL. 15.
... The gift to charity of a picture painted by the taxpayer has been held
to be a gift of property qualifying for the charitable deduction under the
income tax. Hilla Rebay, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 181 (1963).
.. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (1958).
.. Ibid. See Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956).
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man cannot make a gift to himself. Even if the gift is regarded as
a gift to the corporate entity, the amount of the gift should exclude
the donor-stockholder's proportionate share of the donated property
on the theory that to this extent he received consideration for the
transfer in the form of the increase in value of his stock. There is,
however, some difference of judicial opinion on this point 5 If the
gift to the corporation is treated as a single gift to the corporate
entity, the donor can claim only a single exclusion against the gift.
It is not clear whether he will be entitled to any exclusions if the
gift is treated as a group of gifts to the individual stockholders.
In Heringer v. Commissionery the court said that there would be
no exclusions in this case because the stockholders took future
interests in the donated property.
The element of a taxable gift that has provoked most litigation
is the requirement that the transfer must be a complete transfer.
An incomplete transfer is not treated as a taxable gift. Originally,
the Supreme Court seemed to take the view that the test of a complete
transfer under the gift tax was the way in which the transfer was
treated under the estate tax, since the gift tax was designed to sup-
plement the estate tax. Thus, when a man transferred property to a
trust and retained power to revoke the trust,207 or to change the
beneficiaries under the trust, although he could not make himself a
beneficiary,2 °8 the Court held that he had not made a taxable gift.
Since the purpose of the gift tax was to catch transfers that escaped
the estate tax, as long as the transfer remained incomplete and
taxable under the estate tax, it would be treated as incomplete and
nontaxable under the gift tax.
In Smith v. Shaughnessy, °0 however, the Supreme Court re-
pudiated the estate tax test of a complete transfer under the gift
tax. The Court said that the estate and gift taxes are not mutually
exclusive and a transfer will be taxed under the gift tax as a com-
plete transfer whenever the transferred property has passed out
2 0 See LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 172, at 581-82.
:0" Supra. note 185.
20 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933). There will be a gift
when the power to revoke the trust is released. Moreover, as long as the
trust remains revocable there will be gifts whenever income is distributed
to a beneficiary. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (1958); Commissioner v.
Warner, 127 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
o Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
o"318 U.S. 176 (1943).
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of the control of the transferor, regardless of how the transfer is
treated under the estate tax.
Whether or not a transfer is complete for purposes of the gift
tax depends upon whether the transferor has parted with control
over the transferred property. A transfer that the transferor can
revoke, either alone or with the concurrence of a person lacking a
substantial adverse interest in the transferred property, is an in-
complete transfer, which is not taxable under the gift tax.210 The
same thing is true with respect to a transfer beneficial enjoyment
of which can be altered by the transferor, although he cannot make
himself a beneficiary.21' On the other hand, a transfer that can be
altered or revoked by the transferor only with the consent of a
person possessing a substantial adverse interest in the transferred
property is a complete transfer and a taxable gift, at least to the
extent of the adverse person's interest in the property, even though
the transfer is treated as an incomplete transfer which is taxable
under the estate tax.212 For example, if A transfers property to T
in trust for C for life, remainder to D in fee, and retains power
to revoke the trust with C's consent, he has made a taxable gift of
C's life estate. If, however, the trust is revocable in whole or in part,
he has not made a gift of D's remainder, since the remainder could
be revoked without the concurrence of anyone having a beneficial
interest in the remainder.213
There is considerable confusion as to the gift tax consequences
of a transfer which can be altered or amended by one other than the
donor. If there is no power to revest the transferred property in
the donor, it would appear that the transfer would be a complete
transfer and a taxable gift. If, however, the power may be exercised
to revest the transferred property in the transferor but there is no
way of valuing the transferor's potential interest in the property,
it would seem that there would be a complete transfer and a taxable
gift of the entire property,214 although there is authority for the
proposition that there will not be a gift in this situation where the
power to revest the property in the transferor is subject to external
210 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
... Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 30& U.S. 39 (1939).
212 Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952).
212 If the trust can only be revoked in its entirety, there will apparently
be a gift of the whole property. See Camp v. Commissioner, supra note 212.
21 See Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
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standards and does not rest solely in the discretion of the power-
holder.215
Although one of the stated purposes of the gift tax is to prevent
avoidance of the income tax, no attempt has been made to correlate
the gift tax with the income tax. The fact that income from trans-
ferred property remains taxable to the transferor will not prevent
the transfer from being treated as a complete transfer and a taxable
gift if the transferred property has passed beyond the control of
the transferor.2 16
2. Consideration.-With the exception of business transfers,
the test of a taxable gift is not donative intent but the absence of
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. A
transfer for inadequate consideration is treated as a taxable gift
even though it takes the form of a sale or exchange.217 For many
years the Regulations have provided, however, that a "transfer of
property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction
which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative
intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth." 2 " Although the Regula-
tions say that the transfer must be made "in the ordinary course of
business" for adequate consideration to be presumed, the courts have
felt that this requirement is met when there is a genuine arm's
length business transaction.2 19
Consideration that will prevent a taxable gift is not merely good
contractual consideration but the same adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth that is necessary to prevent a tax-
able transfer under the estate tax. It must be a consideration cap-
able of evaluation in monetary terms. It must also be the economic
equivalent of the property transferred, although a transfer for an
insufficient consideration will escape the gift tax up to the value of
the consideration. Unlike the estate tax, the gift tax does not ex-
pressly provide that the relinquishment of marital property rights
... Estate of Leon Holtz, 38 T.C. 37 (1962). See Sarah Gilkey Vander
Weele, 27 T.C. 340 (1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958); Estate of
Christianna K. Gramm, 17 T.C. 1063 (1951).
.1 Lockard v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Commissioner
v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947); Commissioner v. Beck's Estate,
129 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1942).... Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
218 Ibid.
21. See Shelton v. Lockhart, 154 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Mo. 1957); Estate
of Monroe D. Anderson, 8 T.C. 706 (1947).
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will not be treated as consideration, but the Supreme Court has
read this requirement into the gift tax.2 20 The same uncertainty
whether the release of marital support rights constitutes considera-
tion that prevails under the estate tax exists in the case of the gift
tax. The consideration that will prevent a taxable transfer under
the gift tax must also take the form of a benefit to the transferor
rather than a detriment to the transferee. 2'
Only voluntary transfers are taxed under the gift tax. Conse-
quently consideration is only necessary to prevent a transfer resting
upon a promise or agreement from being taxed as a gift. Transfers
to settle marital property rights pursuant to an agreement incor-
porated into a divorce decree will not be treated as taxable gifts if
the transfers are regarded as made pursuant to the decree rather
than to the agreement. 2  Apparently this will occur where the
divorce court had jurisdiction to decree a different settlement from
that prescribed by the agreement incorporated into the divorce
decree.
Section 2516 provides a sure method of making transfers in
connection with a divorce that will not be taxed as gifts for lack of
adequate consideration. Under this section, any transfer pursuant
to a written agreement between husband and wife to settle up their
marital or property rights, or to provide a reasonable allowance
for the support of issue of the marriage during minority, will be
deemed made for adequate consideration provided the parties are
divorced within two years of making the agreement. It is important
to notice that section 2516 requires the spouses to be divorced
within two years of the execution of the agreement; it does not
set any limit within which the transfers must be made. Section
2516 is not exclusive. Thus, a transfer pursuant to a postnuptial
agreement might escape a gift tax even though the parties were not
divorced within two years of making the agreement, if the agree-
ment was incorporated in the divorce decree and the divorce court
had jurisdiction to decree a different settlement.
3. Powers of Appointinent.-Unlike the estate tax, the gift
tax does not contain detailed descriptions of the transfers taxed
under the tax except for section 2514, which prescribes rules for
taxing powers of appointment, and section 2515, which sets forth
.2. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
"' Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
22Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
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an exception to the "common-law" rule for taxing joint tenancies
and tenancies by the entirety.
The gift tax, like the estate tax, equates general powers of
appointment with ownership of the property subject to the power
and follows the provisions for taxing powers of appointment under
the estate tax as closely as the differences between the two taxes
will permit.
Under the gift tax, powers of appointment are divided into pre-
existing powers created on or before October 21, 1942, and post-
1942 powers created after that date. With one exception, where
a post-1942 power is exercised to create a second power that is not
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 2 3 only general powers
are taxed. Post-1942 general powers are fully equated with the
ownership of the property subject to the power by taxing both the
inter vivos exercise and release of the power as a gift.22 4 An ex-
ception to the tax, which parallels the similar exception under the
estate tax, provides that the lapse of a post-1942 general power will
not be treated as a taxable gift to the extent that the property sub-
ject to the lapsed power does not exceed the greater of 5,000 dollars
or five per cent of the fund from which the lapsed power could
have been satisfied.
22 5
Only the inter vivos exercise of a preexisting general power is
taxed as a gift.226 This follows the estate tax treatment of pre-
existing powers.
A general or taxable power is defined in the same way under the
gift tax as it is under the estate tax to include a power under which
the donee may appoint to himself, his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate.2 27 A power to invade or consume property
that is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health,
education, support, or maintenance of the donee is not a taxable
power.228 Nor is a joint preexisting power.229 A joint post-1942
power is a taxable power, unless the person whose concurrence the
donee must have to exercise the power is the donor of the power
or a person possessing a substantial adverse interest in the property
"2a INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(d).
=,INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(b).
... INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(e).
"21 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(a).
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(c).
-- INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(c) (1).
22' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(c) (2).
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subject to the power.2 30 Where, however, a donee exercises or
releases a taxable post-1942 joint power, he is regarded as having
made a gift only of that part of the property equal to the value of
the property divided by a number made up of the donee and the
persons required to concur in the exercise of the power who are
possible appointees.23 '
4. Joint Estates.-The gift tax, unlike the estate tax, does not
prescribe any general statutory rule for taxing joint estates, although
section 2515 lays down an exception to a general "common-law"
rule. Under the general rule, the gift tax consequences of the cre-
ation of a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety depend upon the
property interests the parties acquire in the common property, as
well as their contributions to the consideration for the property,
which are the sole determinant under the estate tax. Thus, if H
purchases stock and takes title in his name and that of W as joint
tenants with right of survivorship, he will make a taxable gift of
one-half of the value of the stock to W4. In a joint tenancy, since
there is a right of severance, each tenant acquires a pro rata interest
in the common property regardless of their life expectancies. If,
instead of taking the stock in his name and that of W as joint
tenants, H had taken title with W as tenants by the entirety, the
measure of the gift to W would have been the actuarial value of the
interest she acquired in the property on the basis of her life ex-
pectancy and that of H. If both tenants contribute to a joint tenancy
or tenancy by the entirety, the taxable gift will be the difference
between the amount contributed to the tenancy by the donor and
the value of the interest he received in the common property.
When a joint estate creation of which was treated as a tax-
able gift is terminated, there will be a taxable gift if one tenant
receives part of the property, or the proceeds of the property, that
exceeds his proportionate interest in the property before the termina-
tion. Thus, if in the hypothetical case in the preceding paragraph,
where H purchased stock and took title in his name and that of his
wife as joint tenants, the spouses later sold the stock and divided the
proceeds equally, there would be no taxable gift. If, however, H
kept the entire proceeds, there would be a gift of half of the pro-
ceeds by W to H.
... IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(c) (3) (A) & (B).
... IT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(c) (3) (C).
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Section 2515 provides that there will not be a gift when a joint
tenancy or tenancy by the entirety in real property is created be-
tween spouses, unless the donor spouse elects by filing a gift tax
return to treat the creation of the tenancy as a gift. If this election
is not made, the spouses are regarded as owning the real estate
according to their respective contributions to the joint tenancy.
Consequently, when a tenancy, creation of which was not treated
as a gift, terminates for any reason other than the death of a spouse,
there will be a gift to the extent that one tenant receives part of the
property, or part of the proceeds of the property, in excess of his
proportionate contribution. For example, suppose that H and W
purchased Blackacre for 40,000 dollars and took title to the prop-
erty as tenants by the entirety. H paid 30,000 dollars of the con-
sideration for Blackacre and W paid 10,000 dollars. Later they
sold the property for 60,000 dollars, which they divided equally
between them. Since W contributed one-fourth of the consideration
for Blackacre, she was entitled to one-fourth of the proceeds or
15,000 dollars. When she received 30,000 dollars, H made a gift
to her of the 15,000 dollars over and above her proportionate share
of the proceeds.
II. TAXABLE GIFTS; DEDUCTIONS
The gift tax is computed by multiplying the taxable rather than
the gross gifts by the rates prescribed by the statute. The taxable
gifts of a citizen or resident of the United States are his gross gifts
less the three deductions allowed by the statute for (1) the exemp-
tion; (2) charitable gifts; and (3) marital gifts. Although non-,
resident alien donors are allowed the gift tax exclusion, they are
limited to the deduction for charitable transfers and do not get
an exemption or marital deduction.
A. The Exemption
Section 2521 provides that a specific exemption of 30,000 dollars
may be deducted in computing the donor's taxable gifts. This is
a lifetime exemption which may be taken only once, although the
donor may take it, or any part of it, whenever he chooses. From
1932 to 1935 inclusive the exemption was 50,000 dollars; from
1936 to 1942 inclusive it was 40,000 dollars; since 1943 it has been
30,000 dollars.
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B. Charitable Transfers
Section 2522 provides that transfers to the governmental units
and the charitable organizations set forth in that section are de-
ductible. The deduction is limited to the amount included in the
donor's gross gifts. Therefore, if a man gave 10,000 dollars to a
charity, his deduction would be limited to 7,000 dollars, since
3,000 dollars of the gift would be excluded from his gross gifts.
Presumably contingent gifts to charity will be handled under
the gift tax in the same way that they are treated under the estate
tax and will not be deductible unless the chance of the charity not
taking is negligible. A power to divert property away from a
charity will also disqualify a transfer to charity for the charitable
deduction under the gift tax in the same way it does under the
estate tax. Unlike the estate tax, however, the gift tax makes no
express provision for disclaiming the power in order to qualify
the transfer for the deduction.
It would appear that the donee of a taxable power of appoint-
ment who appoints property to charity would be entitled to deduct
the property included in his gross gifts because of the power under
the charitable deduction. There is, however, no express provision
for a deduction in this situation under the gift tax as there is under
the estate tax.
C. Marital Deduction
A marital deduction is allowed under the gift tax as well as the
estate tax.232 In general the marital deduction under the gift tax
follows the estate tax, but there are differences because of the dif-
ferences in the two tixes.
Under the gift tax, the amount of the marital deduction is
limited to one-half of the property transferred by one spouse to
another, with the qualification that the deduction cannot exceed
the amount included because of the transfer in the transferor's gross
gifts. Thus, if H gave 10,000 dollars to W, he would be entitled
to a marital deduction of 5,000 dollars. If, however, H gave only
5,000 dollars to W, the marital deduction would be limited to 2,000
dollars, since only this amount, after excluding 3,000 dollars from
the gift, would be included in H's gross gifts.
.. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2523.
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Unlike the estate tax where community property may qualify
for the marital deduction if the decedent has separate property so
that he has an adjusted gross estate, community property does not
qualify for the marital deduction under the gift tax.
The nondeductible terminable interest rule applies to the gift
tax as well as the estate tax. However, nondeductible terminable
interests under the gift tax are limited to a terminable interest in
property given to a spouse, where the donor retained or gave some-
one else an interest in the same property, by virtue of which the
donor or the other person (or their heirs or assigns) might enjoy
the property after the donee spouse's interest terminated. Thus,
if H gave W a life estate in Blackacre and retained the reversion
in the property after W's life estate, or gave the remainder after
the life estate to X, W's life estate would be a nondeductible ter-
minable interest. There is, however, no terminable interest which
is nondeductible because the interest is to be acquired for the donee
spouse under the gift tax.
The only exception to the nondeductible terminable interest rule
common to both the estate and gift taxes is the life-estate power-
of-appointment exception. The survivorship and insurance excep-
tions recognized under the estate tax do not apply to the gift tax.
However, the gift tax makes an exception to the nondeductible
terminable interest rule where a spouse transfers title to property
to himself and his spouse as sole joint tenants or tenants by the
entirety.
III. VALUATION
In general, the same principles of valuation apply to the estate
and gift taxes. There is, however, no alternate valuation date under
the gift tax; donated property is valued according to its fair market
value at the date of the gift.
The same standard of value, fair market value, applies under
both taxes, and the Regulations repeat the same tables for valuing
limited interests, such as annuities, life estates, terms for years,
reversions, and remainders.2  Life insurance that an insured gives
away during his life is valued differently for purposes of the gift
tax than the proceeds of insurance included in the decedent's estate,
.3. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-1 to -7 (1958).
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for purposes of the estate tax at his death, because of obvious dif-
ferences in the properties transferred in the two situations."'
IV. COMPUTATION OF THE TAX; SPLIT GIFTS
The gift tax is computed on a cumulative basis, which means
that although only the gifts made in the taxable year are taxed, the
rate of tax is determined by the taxpayer's total taxable gifts since
1932. The computation is made by first determining the tax on the
taxpayer's total gifts, including his gifts during the taxable year,
using current rates and the current exemption, but the exclusions
actually in effect at the time the gifts were made. Then a similar
tax is computed upon the taxpayer's total taxable gifts in years
prior to the taxable year. Since there are no credits against the gift
tax, the tax due the government is the difference between the two
taxes.
Section 2513 permits a married couple to split their gifts to
those outside the marital community. Although splitting gifts will
not always save gift taxes, it will ordinarily do so, since it may
have the effect of doubling the exclusions and exemptions allowed
against the gifts and taxing them in lower brackets. For example,
if H and W have made no previous gifts and H gives 100,000
dollars to his son S, he will incur a tax of 8,595 dollars on a taxable
gift of 67,000 dollars. If he splits his gift with W, then each spouse's
taxable gift will be 17,000 dollars; his or her gift tax will be 952.50
dollars; and the total tax for both spouses 1,905 dollars.
The gift tax is imposed upon the gifts made during the calendar
year. If a taxpayer makes a gift of a present interest to a single
donee of more than 3,000 dollars, or a gift of a future interest of
any amount, he must file a return (Form 709) by April 15 of the
year following the year in which the gift is made.
.. Upon the insured's death the proceeds of insurance on his life are
included in his gross estate for purposes of the estate tax. When life in-
surance is given away during the insured's life, however, only the then "re-
placement" value of the life insurance is included in the donor's gross gifts.
Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941); United States v. Ryerson,
312 U.S. 260 (1941). When life insurance is taxed to one other than the
estate of the insured during the insured's life under the estate tax, it is
valued according to its "replacement" value just as it is under the gift tax.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (1958).
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